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THE RIGHTS OF PARENTALLY-PLACED PRIVATE 
SCHOOL STUDENTS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 
2004 AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Lewis M. Wasserman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement 
Act ("IDEA/2004" or "the Act") 1 inequitably restricts the 
educational rights of privately-schooled students with 
disabilities relative to students enrolled in public schools.2 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, 
Virginia Tech.; Ph.D. in psychology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York; J .D. , 
St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the helpful commentary and analysis of his law partner, Pamela L. 
Steen, Esq. ,Wasserman Steen, LLP, Patchogue, New York, and the help of the 
author's research assistant, Robert Falconi, B.A., Virginia Tech., in the preparation of 
the manuscript. 
1. IDEA/2004 was enacted as Public Law 108-446, and codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§§1400- 1485. It contains subchapter 1- General Provisions, §§1400-1409; Subchapter 
II-Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities, §§ 1411- 1419; 
Subchapter III- Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, §§ 1431-1444; and Subchapter 
IV-National Activities to Improve Education for Children with Disabilities, §§ 1450-
1482. IDEA/2004 is the most recent in a series of enactments beginning with the 
Education of the Handicapped Act in 1970, 84 Stat. 175. The original act was amended 
substantially in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EHA/75"), 
89 Stat. 773, Pub.L. No. 94- 142, and again as the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act of 1997 Pub. L. No. 105-15 111 Stat. 37 (1997). In 1990, EHA175 was 
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-1142. 
These laws provided financia l support to state and local educational agencies for the 
education of children with disabilities in the nation's public schools. 
2. According to the most current statistics, about 76% of the private schools in 
the United States are characterized as sectarian by the Department of Education, 
OFFICE OF NON-PUBLIC EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF Eouc., STATISTICS ABOUT NON-PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2005), available at 
http://www.ed. gov/about/offices/list/oii/ nonpublic/ statistics.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008). These entities enroll 82'Y., of elementary and secondary private school students. 
Private schools represent about 23% of all the elementary and secondary schools in the 
United States and enroll 10% of the United States elementary and secondary 
population. !d. The total private school enrollment in the United States is 
approximately 5,057,520 students. !d. This information came to the attention of the 
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IDEA/2004 substantially limits the State's duty to furnish 
special education services to privately-schooled students 
compared to students enrolled in public programs.3 Moreover, 
this inequity extends to procedural fairness on such matters as 
parental participation in the development of a child's 
educational plan, access to administrative due process, and the 
availability of judicial remedies for the failure of educational 
agencies to design programs which meet the needs of these 
disabled students or deliver promised services.4 IDEA's goal of 
serving all children with disabilities5 is thus thwarted by 
IDEA/2004 itself.6 This article is a call for a Congressional 
redressing of these inequities. In light of the recency of the 
IDEA/2004 amendments, the likelihood of reform is uncertain. 
A remedy may lie, however, in state legislatures, where 
parents and advocates may receive a more sympathetic ear. 
Part II-A of this article reviews IDEA/2004's core general 
provisiOns, including eligibility criteria, Individualized 
Educational Program ("IEP") development and content, 
parental participation requirements, administrative due 
process and judicial review, and agencies' child find obligations. 
Part 11-B addresses IDEA's funding mechanism for publicly-
enrolled versus privately-enrolled students and the limitations 
under IDEA/2004 on privately-schooled students' rights to 
services, including those delivered on-site and the agencies' 
obligation to discuss services with both private school 
representatives and parents. Part 11-C examines IDEA/2004's 
author in Ra lph D. Mawdsley and Alan Osborn, Providing Special Education Services 
to Students in Religious Schools. 219 ED. LAW REP. 347, 348 (2007). It was derived from 
the NAT'L C'fR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PRlVATI': SCfl . UNIVEHSI>: SURV I·:Y, 
CHAHACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN TH~~ UNITED STATES: THE 2003-2004 PI{IVATE 
SCHOOL UNIVImSE SURVEY (March 2006). 
:3. IDEA/2004 denies disabled students who are parentally-enrolled in private 
schools an individual right to special education services. 34 C. F.R. § :oO(l.l :n(a) --(c) 
(2007). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130-300.144 (2007) . Thus, 
Congress has virtually guara nteed that the needs of private school pupils would rcel!ive 
a less focu sed a nd thoughtful exami nation than their public school counterparts. 
4. 34 C.F.R. §§ :oOO.l 37(a)--(c), 300.134. In terms of sheer numbers. however, the 
negative impact on students attending religious schools is far greate r. See supra, note 
2. Moreover, when state constitutional and statutory enactments limit assi sta nce to 
students attending religious schools, but not private non-sectaria n schools, t he adverse 
impact is exacerbated. 
5. See lDEA/2004 20 U.S. C. § l400(d)(l)(A). 
6. TDEA/2004 continues the inequitable treatment of disabled students enroll ed 
in religious schools , which treatment unambiguously existed in its predecessor statute 
(IDEA/97), and arguably in earli er versions of the Act. See Individuals with Disabi lities 
Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, lll Stat. 37 (1997). 
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treatment of home-schooled students. 
Part III considers the rights of disabled students enrolled in 
sectarian schools to receive on-site services. This part reviews 
the Establishment Clause restrictions and whether the Free 
Exercise Clause requires the state to provide services 
comparable to those received by publicly-enrolled pupils. 
Part IV scrutinizes IDEA/2004's treatment of students 
enrolled in sectarian schools under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
Part V looks at IDEA/2004's decision-making process 
concerning special education for privately-schooled students 
under IDEA/2004; it then asks whether an adequate remedy 
exists under state law for arbitrary determinations by the 
applicable agency. 
Part VI focuses on state legislative enactments which 
provide benefits to parentally-enrolled private school pupils 
with disabilities in excess of IDEA/2004's requirements. 
Part VII examines the impact of restrictive state 
constitutional religion clauses and statutes on the right of 
disabled students enrolled in sectarian schools to receive IDEA-
mandated services.7 The availability of IDEA/2004's "by-pass" 
procedures to overcome these prohibitions and deliver such 
support is examined as well.x 
7. Arguably, if the SEA m· LEA employees furnished direct assistance to such 
students, it would he for th e benefit of the student, and would not result in direct or 
indirect aid to the religious school. Thi s may satisfy state constitutional restrictions. 
Sec, e .~ .. Biiy Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. T. ex rel. R., 405 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 (E.D. 
N.Y. 200!>), t}(u:atcd (or lac!~ of federal subject matter jurisdiction , 485 F.3d 7:30 (2nd 
Cit· . 2007). 
H. As1;uming that there are no state constitutional bars to state provisions of 
special education and related services to parentally-placed disabled pupils, IDEA/2004 
creates potential complications due to its ''maintenance of effort" requirements. See 
lDEA/2004 § l412 (a)(l8)(A). Th e "maintenance of effort" requires that a state "not 
reduce the amount of State financial support for special education and related services 
fur children with disabilities, or otherwise made available because of the excess costs of 
educating those chi ldren, below the amount of that support for the preceding fiscal 
Yl~ar." /d. Thus, while supplementation of lDEA/2004 funding by states is permitted, 
agencies risk bein g re4uired to continue the established funding level in future years, 
notwithstanding any newly arising fisca l constraints. See, Letter to DeLaura, 36 IND. 
WITH DISABILITIES i<:DUC. L. REP. 38 (Office of Special Education Progra ms 2001) 
(explaining that if a city discontinued funding LEA services to parentally-placed 
private school students with disabilities. the IDEA's Part B "maintenance of effort" 
requirement might obligate the LEA to continue the established non-federal funding 
level). Since the maintenance of effort requirement applies only to the total amount, or 
per eapita a mount . from local funds actually expended, or the combination of State and 
local funds actually expended for educating special needs children. the Act would not 
necessarily eompel an LEA to continue to spend state and local monies on private 
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Part VIII integrates Parts II through VII to propose certain 
amendments to IDEA/2004, as well as state statutory 
remedies, to rectify the inequities described in those sections. 
Part IX concludes by asserting that provisions requiring 
comparable educational programs and services to parentally-
enrolled private school children with disabilities would better 
serve the overarching purpose of the Act, which is to provide 
children with disabilities an appropriate education, 9 without 
disrupting the delicate balance of power set out between state 
and federal governments in our constitutional scheme. 
II. IDEA/2004 
A. General Provisions 
IDEA/2004 provides federal money to assist state education 
agencies ("SEAs") and local education agencies ("LEAs") in 
educating children with disabilities. This funding is 
conditioned upon compliance with extensive goals and 
procedures. 10 11 The Act requires states to provide disabled 
school students. ld. 
9. Regardless of a private school's sectarian affiliation, private school students 
may be entitled to educational benefits under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 749, if 
the school directly or indirectly receives federal financial assistance. See Cain v. 
Archdiocese of Kan. City, 508 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Kan. 1981). Even when private 
schools do not receive federal financial assistance, they are subject to the public 
accommodations provisions of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Education 
Act. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-82. Religious institutions are exempted from the 
Departme nt of Justice's authority to investigate disability discrimination complaints 
against public and private elementary and secondary schools, alleging viol ations of 
Title Ill. See OCR Senior Staff Memorandum, 19 IND. WTTH DISABlLITlES Enuc. L. REP. 
889 (1992) (explaining the jurisdictional limits of the U.S . Department of Ju stice, as 
against r el igious institutions under the ADA). 
10. 20 U.S.C. § 12:34(c). The U.S. Department of Education audits states' use of 
IDEA funds afte r their receipt, and may order states to refund amounts that were 
spent improperly. ld; 20 U.S.C. § 12:34(a); 34 C.F.R. § 76.910. See La. State Bd. of 
Secondary Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. , 881 F 2d 204, 205- 207 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(reversing decision that California must repay $1.2 million not ob ligated during correct 
time fram e, on the ground that the decision went beyond issues identified in notice of 
hearing). But see Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 864 F.2d 655, 659- 660 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(requiring State Board of Education to refund money despite aq{ument that state 
superintendent was responsible for misapplication of fund s) . 
IDEN2004 is interpreted under Congress's spending power. Sec Schaffer ex rel. 
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); U.S. CONST. art. l , § 8, cL 1. (This is a grant to 
Congress to spend money to provide for the "general welfare of the United States.") 
Because the power to legislate under the Spending Clause rests on wheth er the state 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract, those conditions Congress 
intends to impose on the funding recipient must be expressed unambiguously. See Bd. 
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children with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") 12 
which includes "special education 13 and related services." 14 
IDEA/2004 recognizes thirteen categories of disability 15 plus, at 
of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, n. 26 (1982) 
(interpreti ng the EHA of 1975); Sch. Dist. of the City of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S. 
Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 26 1 (6th Cir. 2008) (invalidating unfunded mandate 
requirement of the No Child Left Behind Act as interpreted by the Secretary, on t he 
ground that the statute did not give clear notice to funding recipients that they would 
bear the cost of compliance above federally supported a mounts) , reh'g granted en bane, 
opinion vacated (May 1, 2008) (no determination on the merits has been made in this 
appea l). 
11. The "clear statement rule" is one of several general restrictions on 
congressional spending authority. S. D. v. Dole, 483 U.S . 203, 207- 08 (1987) 
(conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on state's adopting minimum drinking 
age of twenty-one comports with Article l's Spending Clause requirements). 
Congressional action must be in pursuit of the general welfare, the conditions must be 
related to the federal interest being pursued, the financial incentives must not amount 
to coercion, and the conditions must comport with other constitutional provisions. ld. 
12. TDEA/2004 § 1401(9) defines free appropriate public education as "[S)pecial 
education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public expense, under 
public supervision a nd direction, a nd without charge; (B) meet the standards of the 
State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool , ele mentary school, or 
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity 
with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this 
t itl e." This definition is the same as the one that appeared in IDEA/97 §1401(8). 
13. IDEA/2004 § 1401(29) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.39 (2007) define "special education" 
as "specially designed instruction, a t no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of 
a child with a disability, including- (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the 
home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in 
physical education." Special education includes: "(i) Speech-language pathology 
services, or any other related service, if the service is considered special education 
rather than a related service under State standards; (ii) Travel training; a nd (i ii) 
Vocational education." 34 C. F.R. § 800.39(a)(2) (2007). See al.~o 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3) 
(2007) ("Specially designed instruction means adapting, as appropriate t.o the needs of 
a n eligible child ... the content, methodology, or delivery of ins truction- (i) To address 
the unique needs of the chi ld that resul t fro m the child's disability; and (ii) To ensure 
access of the child to the general curriculum, so that the child can meet the educational 
standards within the jurisdiction of the public agency that apply to all ch ildren"). 34 
C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(:-l) (2007). 
14. See :34 C.F.R. § :300.34(a) (2007) ("Related services mea ns transportation and 
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as are required to assist 
a child with a disabili ty to benefit from special education, and includes speech-
language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological 
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic 
recreation, ea rly identification a nd assessment of disabilities in children, counseling 
services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services , and 
medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. Related services a lso include 
school health services and school nurse services, social work services in schools, and 
parent counseling and tra ining."). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300. 34(b)( l ) (2006) ("Related 
services do not include a medical device that is surgically implanted, the optimization 
of that device's functioning (e.g. mapping), maintenance of the device, or the 
replacement of the device ."). Each of the related services listed in 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a) 
is defined in§§ il00.84(c)(l)- (16). This regulation implements IDEA/2004 § 1401(26). 
15. il4 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(l)- (l::l) (2007). These disabilities are: a utism, deaf-
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the discretion of the states, one additional category of 
disability. 16 
To be eligible for special education and related services 
under IDEA/2004, a student must be between three and 
twenty-one years old 17 and meet the requirements of a two-part 
test. First, the student must qualify under one or more of the 
thirteen disability categories, or the fourteenth, where 
applicable. 18 Second, the child must need special education and 
related services as a result of his or her disability. 19 
blindness, deafness, emotional disturba nce, hearing impairment, menta l re tardation, 
multiple disabilities, orthopedic impairment, other health impediments, specific 
learnin g disabilities, speech and language impairment, traumatic bra in injury, and 
visua l impairment. Id. 
16 . . '3 4 C.F.R § :iOO.S(b) (2007) provides that the term "child wi t h a disability" 
a ges three through nine may include a child "(1) fw]ho is experiencing developmental 
delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instwments 
a nd procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development , cogniti ve 
development, communication development , social or emotional developme nt. or 
ada ptive development; and (2) [w]ho, by rea son thereof, needs specia l education and 
re lated services." (emphasis added) 
This s ta ndard is incorporated in IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (:3)(R) . A state which 
adopts t he term "developmental delay" under § :300.8(b) determines whether it applies 
to children aged three through nine, or to a subset of that age range, for example, ages 
three through five. See 34 C.F.R. § :l00.111(b) (2007). Although a sta te may not compel 
an LEA to adopt and use the term developmental delay for children within its 
jurisdicti on, those LEAs choosing to do so must employ the state's definition. See :34 
C. F.R §§ 300.111 (b)(2)-(:3) (2007). lf a state does not adopt the te rm developmental 
delay, a n LEA may not independently use that term for establishing IDEA/2004 
eligibility. See :'l4 C.F.R. § 300.lll(h)(4) (2006) . The authority for a doption of this 
regulation is IDEA/2004 § 1401(:J)(B). 
17. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 01 - l 02 (2007). A state need not provide IDEA/2004 
Part B services to children with disabili t ies ages three, four or five if "inconsis tent with 
State la w or practice or the order of a ny court with respecting the previ sion of public 
education" for nondisabled children in tha t age group. 34 C.F.R. § :300.102(a ) (2007). If 
a Sta te does not provide public educa tion to nondisabled children under age six. then it 
is not required to provide services under IDEN2004 Part B until such children attain 
age six. See 34 C.F.R § :300.102(a)(l) (2007). 
18. See 34 C.F.R. § :-lOO.S(c)(l)- (1 :3) (2007); :34 C.F.R. ~ :300.8(b) (2007) (the 
fourteen th disability is separate a nd is applicable at the discretion of the sta te). 
19. S ee IDEA/2004 ~ 1401(i3) (A)(ii). Thi s definition is implemented a t 34 C.F.R. § 
:300.8(a)( l ) (2007). IDEN2004 conta ins various exclusions from eligibili ty. According to 
20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(5)(A), a ch ild shall not be determined to he a child with a disability 
if the "determinant factor" is a "lack of a ppropriate instruction in reading, including 
the essential components of rea ding ins t ruction [a s defined in th e No Ch ild Left Behind 
Act ("'NCLI3"), :34 C.F.R. § 300. :306(b)(l )(i)]. NCLB defines the te rm "essential 
components of reading instruction' to mean: "explicit and syste ma tic instruction in 
phonemic awareness; phonics; vocabulary development; reading flu ency, including oral 
reading skills; and reading comprehension strategies. 20 U.S.C. § 6:368(3). 
Additionally, IDEA retained the previous law's exclusion from eligibility for 
determina nt factors of limited F:nglish proficiency and lack of instruction in math. 20 
u.s.c. § 1414(c)(5)(B)--(C); 34 C.F'.R. ~ aoo. :'l06(b)(l)(ii)-(iii). 
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Once the student is determined to be IDEA/2004 eligible, 
the child must receive an individualized education program 
("IEP"). 20 IEP teams must formulate the IEP before they make 
a placement decision. 21 22 
IEPs are written documents 23 created by IEP teams24 
which detail the individual services required to accommodate 
the educational needs of the disabled student. The IEP must be 
provided in the "least restrictive environment." 25 IDEA/2004 
20. See IDEA/2004 at§ 1414(d)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300. 323(a) (2007). 
21. :-l4 C. F.R. § :300.116(b)(2) (2007). The 1999 regulations implementing 
IDEA/97, :-l4 C.F.R. § 300.552(h)(2) (1999), provided tha t placement decisions could be 
made only after the development of an IEP and in accordance with its terms. The 
appendi x to the impl ementing regulations explained: "The appropriate placemen t for a 
pa rticular child with a disability cannot be determined until after decisions have been 
made about the child 's needs and the services that the public agency will provide to 
meet those needs. These decisions must be made at the IEP meeting, and it would not 
be permissible to first place the child and then develop the lEP. Therefore, the IEP 
must be developed before pl acement." 34 C. F.R. § 300 (app. A, question 14) (1999). The 
2007 regulations continued this requirement. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(h)(2) (2007). They 
provide that placement decisions can be made only after development of an IEP and in 
accordance with its terms. Id. 
22. In essence, placement establishes the location to implement the child's 
IEP. Id. This is controlled by what the least restrictive environment for the child is . See 
generally :34 C.F.R. §§ :300.114-300. 120 (2007). Effective placement depends upon the 
TEP. See :34 C.F.R. ~:300 .1 16(b)(2) (2007). Genera lly, unless the IEP requires otherwise, 
when deciding where to educate the child, pri01·it.y should he given to a place as close to 
the child's home as possible. See :34 C.F.R. § :300. ll6(b)(:3) (2007). Further, each public 
agency must ensure that unless the IEP of a child requires otherwise, the school that 
the child would normally attend should educate the child. See 34 C.F .R. § 300. 116(c) 
(2007). 
23. 34 C.F.R. § 300. :320(a) (2007) (implementing IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C. § 
1414(d)(I)(A)(i)). The mle defines a n IEP as "a written statement for each child with a 
disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in a meeting in accordance with" the 
requirements of IDEA/2004. The requirements for such meetings are set forth at :34 
C.F.R. §§ 300. :12 1-:300. 328 (2007). 
24. See IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)( 1)(B). IDEA/2004 identifies both 
mandatory and permitted members of the IEP team. IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 
1414(d)(l)(B)- (D). New provisions from IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C),a nd 34 
C.F.R. § :300.:321(e) (2007) prescribe conditions under which the attendance of an 
otherwise required member may be excused or not required. The IEP team must 
engage in a genuine delibera tive process about the disa bled child's individual needs for 
programs and services. Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. :3()2 F.3d 840. 
858-59 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied. 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Spielberg v. Henrico County 
Pub. Sch. , 853 F.2d 256, 258- 259 (4th Cir. 1988). This requ irement includes providing 
the parents with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of their 
child's IEP. Id. Where school officials predetermine what a child's services should be, 
prior to the IEP team meeting, courts may annul the IEP. See, e.g., Deal, :392 F.:-ld at 
858-59 (annulling an IEP since parents' IEP participation was a matter of form and 
after the fact): W.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 
1484-14 85 (9th Cir. 1992). 
25. :34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2) (2007) provides: Each public agency must ensure 
that-(i) To the maximum extent appropriate, children with di sabilities, including 
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lists the eight required components that must be included in 
every child's IEP. 26 For disabled children who have limited 
children in public or private institutions or other care faci lities, are educated with 
children who are non·disabled; and (ii) Special classes, separate schooling or other 
removal of children with disabilities from the regular education a l environment occurs 
only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in r·egular classes 
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be ach iPved satisfactoril y.'' 
IDEN2004 §14l 2(a)(5)(A) contains this langu age. IDEA/2004 defines "supplementary 
aids and services" as "aids, services, and other supports tha t are provided in regular 
education classes or other educational -related settings to enabl e children with 
disabilities to be educated with nondisahled children to the maximum extent 
appropriate ." See IDEA/2004 § 1401(::33). The 2004 amendments har sta tes from using 
"a funding mechanism by which [they] distribute[] funds on the bas is of the type of 
setting in which a child is served that will result in the failure to provide a child with a 
disability a [free appropriate public education ] according to the uniyue needs of the 
child as described in the child's IEP." JDEA/2004 § 141 2(a)(5)(B)(i). The conference 
committee's comment to ID EA/2004 §1412(a)(5)(13) describes the continuum of 
placement [from least to most restrictive] as "instruction in regular classes, specia l 
classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospita ls and 
institutions." 
26. JDEA/2004 § l414(d)(l)(A)(i)(I)-(VIII). These are: (I) a statement of the chi ld 's 
present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, im:ludin g- (aa) 
how the child 's disability affects th e child's invol vem ent and progress in thP general 
education curriculum; (bb) for preschool ehild rcn, as appropriate, how the disability 
affects the child's participation in ap propriate activities: and (cc) for children with 
disa bilities who take a lternate assessments aligned to a lternate achievement 
standards, a description of benchmarks or short-term objectives; (II) a statement of 
measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals designed to- (aa) 
meet the child 's needs that result from the child's disabili ty to enable the child to be 
involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and (bb) meet each 
of the child's other educational needs that result from the child's disability; (I II) a 
description of how the child 's progress toward meeting the annual goals described in 
subclau se (II) will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress the chi ld is 
making toward meeting the annual goals (such as through the use of quarterly or other 
periodic reports, concurrent with the issuance of report cards) will be provided; (IV) a 
statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and 
services, based on peer-reviewed r esearch to the extent practicable, to be provided to 
the child, or on beha lf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or 
supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child- (aa) to advance 
appropriately toward attaining the annual goals; (bb) to be involved in and make 
progress in the general education curriculum in accordance with subclause (I) and to 
participate in extracurricular and other nonacademic activities; and (cc) to be educated 
and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children in the 
activities described in this subparagraph; (V) an explanation of the extent, if any, to 
which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class and 
in the act ivities described [above]; (VI)-(aa) a statement of any individual appropriate 
accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic achieve ment and 
functional performance of the child on State and districtwide assessments consistent 
with section 1412(a)(l6)(A): and (bb) if the IEP Team determines that the child shall 
take an alternative assessment on a particular State or district wide assessment of 
student achievement, a statement of why-(AA) the child cannot participate in the 
regular assessment; and (BB) the particular alternative assessment selected is 
appropriate for the child; (VII) the projected date for the beginning of the services and 
modifications described in subclause (IV), and the anticipated frequency, location, and 
duration of those services and modifications; and (VIII) beginning not later than the 
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English proficiency ("LEP"), the IEP team must consider the 
language needs of the child, as well. 27 As long as the IEP meets 
the above-mentioned requirements, nothing more is required.2~ 
29 
IEPs must be reviewed by the IEP team at least once 
annually.30 At the annual review, the IEP team evaluates the 
efficacy of the child's IEP, and makes appropriate changes to 
meet the child's current needs. 31 IEP teams must formulate the 
first IEP to be in effect when the child is 16, and updated annually thereafter-(aa) 
appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition 
assessments related to training, education, employment, and, where appropriate, 
independent living skills; (bb) the transition services (including courses of study) 
needed to assist the child in reaching those goals; and (cc) beginning not later than 1 
year before the child reaches the age of majority under State law, a statement that the 
child has been informed of the child's rights under this title, if any, that will transfer to 
the child on reaching the age of majority under section 1415(m) .. . . 
27. :34 C.F.R. § 300.:324(a)(2)(ii) . Among the factors IEP teams should discuss 
concerning limited English proficiency students are the extent to which the child 
should (1) receive instruction in English or his native language, (2) participate in the 
general curriculum, and (:l) receive English language tutoring on his IEP. See 64 Fed. 
Reg. 12406, 12589 (1999). These provisions were not carried into the 2007 regulations 
impll•menting lDEA/2004. However, logic and good pedagogy would dictate they retain 
their vitality. 
28. See IDEA/2004 §1414(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
29. IDEA/2004 §1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(l)-(VIII) made the following changes in required 
IEP content, as compared to IDEA/97 § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(VITI) and its 1999 
implementing regulations: in section I, "academic" and "functional" were inserted 
before "achievement" and performance, respectively; except for students who take 
alternative assessments aligned to alternative achievement standards, the 
requirement for benchmarks or short-term objectives for each goal has been eliminated; 
the IEP must state how the child's progress toward meeting annual goals will be 
measured and when reports on such progress will be provided; to the extent practicable 
the special education and related services to be provided the child must be based on 
peer-reviewed research; IEPs must contain a statement of individual appropriate 
accommodations necessary "to measure the academic achievement and functional 
performance" of the child on State and district assessments and the term 
"modifications" has been deleted from the text; where the IEP team determines that a 
child shall participate in alternative assessments, it must explain why the child cannot 
participate in the regular assessment and why the alternative assessment it selected is 
appropriate; a statement of needed transition services when the student attains age 
fourteen is no longer required; however, IDEA/2004 mandates that the first IEP in 
effect when the student reaches age sixteen must contain appropriate, measurable 
postsecondary goals and a list of the transition services needed to assist the student in 
achieving those goals. 
30. See IDEA/2004 § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1) (2007). 
31. IDEA/2004 § 1414(d)(4)(A). The statute lists five factors IEP teams should 
consider in recommending IEP changes: (1) any lack of expected progress toward the 
annual goals and in the general curriculum; (2) the results of any reevaluation; (3) 
information about the child provided to, or by, the parents during the evaluation 
process; (4) the child's anticipated needs; and (5) other matters. IDEA/2004 
§1414(d)(4)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(l)(ii) (2007). 
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IEP before they make a placement decision. 32 
IDEA/2004 requires particularized written notice whenever 
the LEA proposes or refuses to change "the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to the child."-'3 
1. The child find obligation 
IDEA/2004 imposes on funding reCipients the so-called 
"child find" obligation.34 Child find requires states to identify, 
locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing 
within their respective state. 35 This obligation encompasses all 
children with disabilities who are homeless, wards of the State, 
32. See IDEA/2004 at § 141 4(d) (2)(A); :34 C.F .R. § 300.:32 :~(a) (2007). The 199~J 
r egulations implementing IDEA/97 at 34 C. P.R. § 300.552(b)(2) (Hl99) provided that 
placement decis ions can be made only a fter the development of an lEI'. and in 
accorda nce with its terms. 34 C.F.R. § :300 (app. A. question 14) (1999) explained. "The 
a ppropria te placement for a particul a r child wi th a disabili t y cannot bl' dc t<'nnined 
un til afte r decisions have been made about th e child's ne<~ds and th e se rvices thnL the 
public agency will provide to meet th ose needs . These decisions must he made at the 
I EP meeting, and it would not be permissible to first place the child a nd th e n de velop 
the IEP. There fore, the IEP must be developed before placement." Th e 2007 regulations 
continued this requirement. 34 C.F.R. § i300.116(b)(2) (2007). '!'hey providt> that 
placement decisions can be made only after development of an II~P and in accordanct> 
with its t erms. ld. Placements a re controlled hy what is the least rt·stridiw 
environment for the child. See :34 C.F.R. §§ :-100.114-:100.120 (2007) . Such plact•rnents 
are dependent on the IEP. See 34 C. F .R. §i300.l16(b)(2) (2007). Ge m·rally, unless the 
IEP requires otherwi se, the child should he educated as close as possible t.o t he ehild's 
home. See ~~4 C.F.R. § i300.116(b)(i3) (2007). Furthe r, each public a gt~ ncy mw;t. ensure 
t ha t unless th e IEP of a child requires some other a r rangement. the child is educated 
in t he school that he or she would attend if nondisahled. Sec :34 C.F.R. ~ :lOO.IIG(c) 
(2007) . 
33. See IDEA/2004 § 14lfi(h)(3). The r equirements of the notice is detailed in 
!D~~A/2004 § l4lfi(c)(I), which states: The notice required by subsection (b)(:\) shall 
include-(A) a description of the action proposed or rdused hy the age ncy; (13) an 
explana tion of why the agency proposes or refu ses to take the action and a description 
of each evaluation proet>dure, assessment, record, or report the agency used a s a basis 
for the proposed or rt>fused action; (C) a s ta tement that the parents of n child with a 
disability have protection unde r the procedura l sa feguards of this pa rt and . if this 
notice is not a n initial referra l for evalua tion, the means by which a copy t>f tht> 
descript ion of the procedural safegua rds can be obtained; (U) sources f(n· pa n •nts to 
contact to obtain assistance in unders t a nding the provis ions of this pa r t ; (I•;) a 
description of other options cons ider ed by the IEL' Team and t he reason why those 
opt ions were rejected; and (F) a description of the factors tha t an• r e levant to the 
agency's proposal or refusal. 
:34. See 1DEN2004 § 1412(a)( Cl)(A). This duty entails screening to idt>ntify 
children who are disabled, or suspected of having a disability. and be ing in nucd of 
specia l education and related services, as opposed to the actual de live ry uf special 
education a nd related services. 
::l5. /d . 
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or attending private schools.36 There are no exceptions, 
regardless of the severity of the disability_}? The statute also 
mandates the development of a practical method to determine 
which children currently receive needed special education and 
related services. 38 
The breadth of the child find obligations can be surprising. 
School districts' child find duties begin at birth. 39 Since child 
find duties are "affirmative," a parent is not required to request 
an evaluation of the child.40 The child find obligation is 
sweeping and extends to "children with disabilities in the State 
who are enrolled in private, including religious, elementary 
schools and secondary schools."41 The design of child find 
activities must ensure equitable participation of parentally-
placed private school children with disabilities and an accurate 
count of such children.42 Notably, IDEA/2004 imposes the child 
find obligation on the LEA where the private school is 
located,43 even when the LEA is located in a different state 
than where the child resides.44 This contrasts with IDEA/97's 
child find obligation, which placed this responsibility on the 
school district of the child's residence.45 
:36. ld. 
:n Id. 
:38. See TDEA/2004 §§ 1412(a)(::l)(A), (a)(10)(A)(iii). Child find obligations were 
conta ined in IDEA/97 § 1412(a) and implemented in 34 C.F.R. §§:300.125 , :300.220(a) 
(1999). In the 2007 regulations, they appear in 34 C.F.R. §§ ~00.111, :300.131 (2007). 
:39. See IDEA/2004 § 14~1 (strengthens findings and policy on this point, as 
compared with §14::ll of IDEA/97, the prior law). The duty to "child find" from birth has 
been a n obligation of school districts for more than thi1·ty years . See MARK WEllER, 
SPECIAL Enuc . Lrnr;N!'lON TREATISE, Ch. 11 (LRl' Publications 2004). 
40. See Robertson County Sch. Sys. v. King, 99 F.3d. 11:-!9 (6th Cir. 1996) (decided 
under IDEA/1990). Local school districts are ordinarily responsible for carrying out 
chilrl find activities for children within their jurisdiction. ld. 
41. IDEA/2004 §1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(l) (emphasis added). Child find duties apply 
regardless of the severity of the disability, whether the child has ever attended or will 
ever attend a public school, or whether the state serves infants and toddlers (zero to 
two years old) under IDEA/2004 part C or preschool children (three to five years old) 
under ID~~A/2004 part B. S ee 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.111. 300.13 1 & 800.201 (2007). Further, 
the child find duty applies where the child is in the custody or under the jurisdiction of 
any puhlic or private agency or institution. Id .. 
42. :34 C.F.R. § 300. 181 (b)(1)-(2) (2007). 
43. See 34 C.F.R. § 30(l.l :H(a) (2007). 
44. See :34 C.F.R. S :!00.131(£) (2007). 
45. 20 U.S.C. SS 14 I 2(a)(8)(A), 141 2(a)(JO)(A)(iii) (T). 
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B. Private School Students Under IDEA/ 2004 
1. Child find for parentally-placed private school students 
'l'he rules surrounding child find are fairly equivalent for 
privately-enrolled and publically-enrolled children. With 
respect to privately enrolled pupils, an LEA or SEA, where 
applicable, must undertake child find activities in a manner 
similar to those it employs for public school children. 46 Child 
find activities for children enrolled in private schools must be 
completed in a time period comparable to that of children 
attending public schools.47 School districts must consult with 
representatives of the private schools regarding child find 
procedures.48 The costs incurred by LEAs in conducting child 
find, including individual evaluations, cannot be considered in 
determining whether LEAs have met their expenditure 
obligations under IDEA/2004 to parentally-placed private 
school children. 49 
The parent of a privately-placed child may use the due 
process complaint hearing procedure when alleging a child find 
violation. Unless a child find violation is alleged, the parent 
may not use the due process complaint hearing procedures 
(available to publicly-enrolled students with disabilities) to 
obtain relief for violations of the Act. 50 Under such 
circumstances, the child find complainant must allege that the 
school district has failed to properly identify, locate, or evaluate 
the private school student. 51 In the absence of an allegation of 
such child find failures, parents of private school pupils must 
employ the complaint resolution or other procedures adopted 
by the state to obtain relief over implementation of the Act. 52 53 
46. See lDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(A)(ii)(III). This would include 
activities such as distribution of informational brochures, provision of regular public 
service announcements, staffing exhibits at health fairs, creating liaisons with private 
schools, and similar activities. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,593 (2006). 
47. See IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(V); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13l(e) (2007). 
LEAs may not wait until they have completed evaluating publicly-enrolled students 
before they conduct evaluations on those who are privately-enrolled. See 71 Fed. Reg. 
46,593 (2006). 
48. See IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(iii) . 
49. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13l(d), 300.133 (2007). 
50. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(b)(2) (2007). 
51. See ~34 C.F.R. § 300.140(b)(l) (2007). 
52. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.140 (2006). 
53. Where child find failures occur in connection with parentally-enrolled private 
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2. Expenditure of Part B funds 
Although IDEA/2004 requires school districts to devote 
federal IDEA/2004 Part B funds to parentally-placed private 
school children with disabilities as a group, it does not obligate 
the expenditure of state funds for special education and related 
services for particular privately-schooled students. The 
expenditure of IDEA/2004 funds must be proportionate to the 
number of children enrolled in private schools within the 
district, not the number of resident children in the district as 
under IDEA/97. 54 In essence, IDEA/2004 measures the LEA's 
financial obligation by the percentage of all private school 
children with disabilities being educated within the district. 55 
Although the Act does not require LEAs to expend state and 
local monies for special education and related services for 
parentally-placed private school children, 56 IDEA/2004 does not 
prohibit SEAs or LEAs from spending beyond the federal 
allotment for provision of special education and related 
services. 57 
school pupil s, uncertainty exist s as to whether parents may recover tuition a nd other 
costs incurred for the child 's placement under IDEA/2004. § l412(a)(10)(C)(ii) provides 
such a remedy for children "who previously received special education and related 
services under the authority of the agency." See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of 
N. Y. v. Tom. F. ex rei. Gilbert F. , 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2nd Cir. 2006), aff'd 128 S.Ct. 1. 
(2007). In Tom F. the Supreme Court, construing the salutary purposes of the law, 
affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit (on a 4-4 vote, with Ju stice Kennedy not 
participating), permitting tuition reimbursement for a unilateral private school 
placement where the s ubject child had not "previously received" special education and 
related services under the auspices of the agency. ld. 
54. Compare IDEA/2004 §1412(a) (10)(A)(i), with IDEA/97 § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i). The 
2007 regulations implementing this requirement state: 
To the extent consistent with the number and location of children with 
disabilities who are enrolled by their parents in private, including religious, 
elementary and secondary schools located in the school district served by the 
LEA, provision [must be) made for the participation of those children in the 
program assisted or carried out under Part B of the Act by providing them 
with special education and related services in accordance with § 300.137 
unless the [United States Department of Education] has arranged for 
services to those children under the by-pass provisions [of the Act]. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.132 (2007). 
55. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.133(a) (2007). 
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). 
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV); Letter to DeLaura, supra note 8 
(commenting that there was nothing in IDEA/97 Part B that would prohibit an LEA 
from using non-federal funds to provide special education services to unilaterally-
placed students). 
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In determining the "proportionate amount" of part B funds 
that must be devoted to parentally-placed private school 
children aged three through twenty-one, LEAs are required to 
conduct an annual count on any date between October 1st and 
December 1st of each year. 58 This calculation determines the 
amount of part B funds that the LEA will spend on such 
children in the ensuing fiscal year. 59 "Children aged three 
through five are deemed to be parentally-placed private school 
children with disabilities ... if they are enrolled in a private 
school that meets the definition of elementary school under 
§300.13.6° Furthermore, the LEA must calculate the 
proportionate share of IDEA/2004 funds before earmarking 
funds for any authorized, early intervention activities. 61 The 
proportionate share is based on the total number of children 
eligible, not the total children served. 62 Additionally, the school 
district of location must consult with private school 
representatives to determine its number of enrolled disabled 
children and how to allocate the part B funds. 63 This 
58. See 20 U.S. C. § 300.133(a)(ii)(2007) ; :34 C.F.R § 300. 1:33(d) (2007) 
59. See 34 C.F.R. § aoO.l 33(c)(ii) (2007). The appendix to part B of the 2007 
regulations contains a h elpful ill u~tration as to how to perform this calculation. The 
exa mple assumes that t here are 300 eligible students with disabili ties enrolled at th e 
LEA a nd twenty eligible parentally-placed private school children with disabilities 
enrolled in priva te schools located within the LEA. Since 6.25% (20/:320) of the students 
attend private schools within the LEA, the private school students as a group will be 
entitled to 6.25'/\, of the part B subgrant received by the LEA. If the LEA rece ives 
$152,500 in federal fl ow t hrough funds, the example continues, the LEA mus t then 
spend $9,531.25 on specia l education and related services for the group of parentally-
placed private school children with disabilities located in the LEA. 
60. See 34 C.F.R § 300.133(a)(2)(ii) (2007). Under IDEA/2004. a child who is 
home-educated may or may not be considered a parentally-enro lled private school 
student with a disabili ty, since the Act makes this dependent upon state law. See 71 
Fed. Reg. 46.594 (explaining the operation of the provision). Issues related to home-
educated students are discussed in Part V. 
61. :34 C.F.R. § 300.226 (2007). 
62. See 34 C.F.R §300 (app. part B). 
6:3. IDEA/2004 § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(iii). This consultation requi res discuss ion with 
private school representatives nnd representatives of parents concerni ng, among other 
things, "[hjow special ed ucation and related services will be apportioned if funds are 
insufficient to serve a ll parentally-placed private school chi ldren, and lh]ow and when 
these decis ions will be made." ;{4 C.F.R. § 300. 134(d)(2)- (3) (2007). Where pa rents 
contend th e proposed l EP denies their child a FAPE, and they place the ir child 
uni laterally in a private school program which meets the ch ild 's specia l needs, 
TDEA/2004 permits th em to be re imbursed for the tuition a nd r elated expe nses they 
incur if they satisfy the substantive a nd procedural requirements set fo rth in t he Act. 
20 U .S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA/2004 continues without ch anging th e language 
contained in IDEA/87 respecting parental reimbursement. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)( l O)(c)(ii). For an extensive discussion a bout IDEA/2004 rei mbursement see 
Lewis M. Wasserman, R eimbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other Costs under the 
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consultation must be timely and meaningful.64 
3. No individual entitlement 
Parentally-enrolled private school children with disabilities 
who receive special education and related services are entitled 
to this right as a group, not individually. 65 Therefore, such 
children may not insist on receiving their proportionate share 
of part B monies for themselves.66 LEAs' obligation then, is to 
merely provide an opportunity for equitable participation in the 
services funded with part B monies.67 Moreover, the LEA in 
which the private school is located "must make the final 
decisions with respect to the services to be provided to eligible 
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities."68 
Where parents do not contest the adequacy of the IEP 
offered by the LEA and enroll the child in a private school, the 
agency has no obligation to prepare or update the child's IEP.69 
The absence of an individual right for parentally-placed 
children contrasts starkly with the rights of children who, 
pursuant to an IEP, are placed in a private school or facility by 
the LEA, as a means of furnishing a FAPE.7° In the latter case, 
students retain all the procedural and substantive IDEA/2004 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Impro vement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN's J. 
LE(; :\L COMME:--IT. 171 , (2006). 
64. See :34 C.F.R. § 300.1:33(c)(1)(i) (2007). 
6fi. 34 C.F.R. § .'300.137(a) (2007). 
66. 34 C.F.R. § 300.137(a) (2007) provides: "No parentally-placed private school 
child with a disability has an individual right to receive some or all of the special 
education and rela ted services that the child would receive if enroll ed in a public 
school." Pla inly then, under IDEN2004, "parentally-placed private school children with 
disabilities may receive a different a mount of services than children with disabilities in 
public schools." :~4 C.F.R. § 300.138(a)(2) (2007). There are apparently no exceptions to 
thi s rule. !DEAJ2004's predecessor, IDEAJ97 , also made clear that parentally-placed 
private school children had no individual right to a FAPE. S ee aloo 7l Fed. Reg. 46.591) 
(2006} . 
67. See 71 F'ed . Reg. 46,595 (2006). 
6~. S ee :34 C.F.R. § 1:i7(b)(2) (2007). 
69. Discussion accompanying the 1999 regulat ions implem enting IDEN97 made 
clear that there was no provision which compels a school district to develop an IEP th at 
assumes a public placement for each private school s tudent each yea r. Since the 
parents may in voke th eir child's right to return to the public schools a nd receive a 
FAPE, LEAs "must be prepared to develop a n IEP a nd to provide FAPE to a private 
school child if the child 's parents re-enroll the child in the public school." 64 Fed. Reg. 
12,601 (1999). lDEAJ2004's implementing 1·egulations talk only about services plans 
for priva tely-enrolled students. 34 C.F.R. § 300.132(b). 
70. :34 C.F.R. § :100.137 (2007); 70 Fed. Reg. 35846 & 3fi847 (2005). 
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rights enjoyed in public schools.71 
4. Services plans 
In contrast to the detailed IEP requirements imposed on 
LEAs by the IDEA for eligible publically-enrolled pupils, LEAs 
must develop and implement a mere services plan for each 
privately-schooled child designated by the local district to 
receive special education and related services.72 The services 
plan "describes the specific special education and related 
services that the LEA will provide to the child in light of the 
services that the LEA has determined . . . it will make 
available to [the] parentally-placed private school child[ ] with 
disabilities."73 IDEA/2004's implementing regulations provide 
that "[t]he services plan must, to the extent appropriate, meet 
the requirements [set forth in the IEP content for publicly 
enrolled students]."74 Although it is unclear as to which IEP 
components must be included in the services plan, it should at 
least include a statement of what special education, related 
services, and supplementary aids and services the child will 
receive. 75 The services plan should include goals for special 
education and related services of the kind included in IEPs. 76 
LEAs must also adjust to the established lifestyle of the 
student by providing on-site services.17 Such goals should 
71. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.145-300.147 (2007). 
72. See 34 C.F.R § 300.132(b) (2007). The United States Department of Education 
discourages LEAs from using IEPs as the child 's services plan. 71 Fed. Reg. 45,596 
(2006). This is because the IEP will generally include much more services th a n just 
those to which a parentally-placed private school child with a disability may receive. if 
designated to receive such services. !d . There is nothing, however, in these regul a tions 
that would prevent a state that provides more services to parentally-placed private 
school children with disabilities than it is requi red to under the Act to use an IEP in 
pl ace of a services plan , consistent with state law. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,595- 46,596 
(2006). 
73. :H C.F.R. § 300.l 38(b)(l) (2007). 
71. 31 C.F.R. § 30ru:~S(b)(2) (2007) (emphasis added) . 
75. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006) (explaining the services plan requirement of :i4 
C.F.R. §300.1:3S(h)(1): "The services plan also must, to the extent a ppropriate, meet the 
IEP content, development. review, and revision requirements described in section 
636(d) of the Act . . as to the services that are to he provided"). Ana logous 
requirements apply to Individual Family Service Plans ("TFSPs") for ehildren with a 
disability aged three to five years. See 34 C.F.R. § :300.1:38(2)(i) (2007) ; 71 Fed. Reg. 
46,596 (2006). 
76. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006). 
77. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006). The commentary makes clear th at this 
recommendation is limited by federal First Amendment Establishment Clause a nd 
applicable state constitutiona l and statutory considerations. 
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provide, at a minimum, programmatic guidance to the special 
education and related service providers. 
5. Program and service delivery 
Program and delivery service vehicles are provided for both 
privately and pubically-enrolled students. The special 
education and related services in a services plan must be 
provided by employees of the public agency, or through a 
contract entered into between the agency and "an individual, 
association, agency, organization or other entity."78 The special 
education and related services, as well as any materials and 
equipment employed in rendition of same, must be "secular, 
neutral and nonideological."79 
6. Transportation 
LEAs must furnish transportation to a parentally-placed 
child with a disability where services are offered off-site and if 
such transportation is necessary to enable the child to receive 
the services offered under a services plan. 80 If services are 
offered to a parentally-placed child with a disability at a site 
separate from the child's private school, the LEA may be 
required to transport the child to and from that other site. 81 
7. Personnel qualifications 
The personnel qualifications required for public programs 
are vastly superior to those required by private entities. 
IDEA/2004 requires "highly qualified" personnel for public 
agencies responsible for delivery of special programs and 
services to children with special needs.82 83 These requirements 
78. a4 C.F. R. ~ :lOO .l :~8(c){ l) (2007). 
7~J. :14 C.F. R. ~ :JOO. l :i8(c)(2) (2007). 
80. See :14 C.F.R. ~ :'\00.1:19(b)(1) (2007). This is because den ial of such 
transportation may efff~etively de ny the child of t.h<·' opportunity to benefit from the 
services offered in the services plan. 71 Peel. He g. 46,1)96 (2006). The expenses incurred 
in providin g such transportation may he deducted from the proportional share of funds 
allocated to parentally-placed private school children . See :34 C. F .R. ~ :~00.1:~9(b)(2) 
(2007). 
81. See C.F.R. ~ :I00.1 ::1 9(b)(l)(A) (2007). 
82. See :14 C. F.R. ~ :l00.18 (2007). 
8:3. IDEA/2004 revised substantially the qualification requirements to ensure 
that personnel which carry out the purposes of part B are appropri a tely a nd 
adeq uatel y prepared and trained. This includes assuring that those personnel h ave the 
content knowledge and skills to serve students with disabilities. Sec 20 U.S.C. s 
148 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
apply to special education teachers of core academic subjects, 
special education teachers in general, special education 
teachers applying alternative standards, special education 
teachers of multiple subjects, and they also apply a separate 
high objective uniform State standard of evaluation [HOUSSE] 
standards for special education teachers. 84 The requirements 
do not apply to teachers hired by private elementary schools 
and secondary schools, including private school teachers hired 
or contracted by LEAs to provide equitable services to 
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities 
under 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(a)(1).85 
8. The rejection option 
There is nothing in IDEA/2004 or its implementing 
regula tions which compels parents who have placed their child 
in a private school to accept the special education and/or 
related services offered to their disabled child in a services 
plan. It is very unlikely that Congress intended otherwise. 86 
9. LEA reporting requirements 
Apparently to enable SEAs to perform their oversight 
functions of LEAs' compliance, each LEA must maintain 
records and provide the SEA with the following information 
about parentally-placed private school children: the number of 
children it evaluated, the number of children it determined to 
have disabilities, and the number of children it served.87 
10. Relinquishment and reinstatement of the FAPE obligation 
Where the LEA of residence determines the child is 
IDEA/2004 eligible, and parents make clear their intent to 
keep their child in a private school located in another LEA, 
141 2(a)( 14). 
84. See :34 C.F.R. § 300.18 (20()7). 
1-15. See :14 C.F.R. § :300.11-i (2007); 71 Fed. Reg. 46,595 (2006). 
86. Even for students who are entitled to a free appropriate public education, the 
agency ''may not use ... the due process procedures .. . in order to obtain agreement or a 
ruling that the service~ may be provided t.o the ch ild." :l4 C.F.R. § 300.ilOO(b)(:l)(2007). 
Moreover, if the agency t ries, but fail s to obtain parental consent, the school di s trict 
"'will not be considered to be in violation of the r equirement to make ava ila ble FAPE to 
the child for failure to provide the child with the special education a nd re lated services 
for which [it] request s consent ." 34 C.F.R. § 800. 300(b)(4)(i). 
87. See 34 C.F.R. ~ 300.132(c) (2007). 
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IDEA/2004 relieves the LEA of residence from its obligation to 
furnish a F APE to that child. sx This provision assists LEAs in 
defining their then current obligation to the child and the 
parents in understanding what services they may be 
relinquishing by unilaterally enrolling their child in a private 
school. However, parents exercising this option may later 
decide to refer the child to their district of residence for 
provision of a FAPE, in which case the district of residence will, 
under most circumstances, have to comply.89 90 
11. LEA consultation obligation 
ID EA/2004 requires school districts to "timely and 
meaningfui[ly]" consult with private school representatives and 
representatives of parents of private school students when 
designing and developing the services plan for privately-
schooled students.'>' The Act requires such consultation to 
include how, where, and by whom services will be provided to 
private school students, as well as the types of services (both 
the direct and alternative delivery options) that will be 
offered.92 If the private school officials disagree with the LEA's 
decision not to provide direct services, the LEA must furnish a 
IlK. S<'c 71 Fed . Reg. 4G,59:i (2006) (commenting on 34 C.F.R. § 300.1:~1). Neither 
the t·egulations themselves nor the commentary accompanying the regulations indicate 
how an LEA ascerta ins parental "intent" in this regard . Surely, the LEA of residence 
may deve lop a form containing an ad(!quat(' explanation of the parents' options relative 
the child's rece ipt of a FAPE !including the child's right to return to the LEA of 
residence f(,r services] with a written waiver of the right to a FAPE, or s imply offer an 
I El' providing a FAPE.). 
S~J . 71 Fed. Heg. ·1G,59:i (2006). This may create conf1icts among the pe1tinent 
inte rest s. For example, the LEA of residence child study team could dete rmine that the 
child is ineligible fi>r lDE/2004 benefits upon its r eview of the record, and any 
additional eva luat.ions it perform~ . Moreover, it could agree tha t the child is eligible for 
services but that the kinds of programs and services which are appropriate for the child 
are different than those recommended by the LEA of loca tion. Further, the duration, 
t'retJUt' TH:y or intensity of thl, services deemed appropriate might vary as between LEAs. 
90. ~14 C.F.R ~ :100.G22(b)(4) r equires parental consent for r elease of information 
about parentally- placed pri vate school children between LEAs. Therefore, nothing in 
the regulations would prohibit parents from requesting that their child be evaluated by 
the LEA respon sible for FAPE (usually under state law the LEA where the parents 
residP) for purposes of having a FAPE m ade available to the child, while at the same 
timf' reque::;ting the LEA in which the private school is located to evaluate the child for 
purposes of considering the child for equitable services. 71 Fed. Reg. 46.59 :3 (200G). 
Nevert.hdess, the ])(),J di scourages repeated test ing of such children by separa te LEAs. 
/d. 
91. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 1412(a)(JO)(A)(iii) . 
92. /ri. 
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written explanation of that decision.93 LEAs must also confer 
with private schools as to when service allocation decisions will 
be made by the LEA and how services will be apportioned if 
funds are insufficient to serve all children.94 When the 
consultation process has occurred, LEAs must obtain a written 
affirmation signed by representatives of participating private 
schoolsY5 If such information is not forthcoming within a 
reasonable period of time after it is sought, the LEA must 
forward documentation of the consultation process to the state 
agency. 96 
Private school officials may lodge a complaint regarding 
either the consultation process or whether the school gave "due 
consideration" to the views of the private school.97 The 
complaint is made to the SEA and must assert the grounds for 
the "non-compliance."98 The LEA must respond to the SEA 
with "appropriate documentation."99 Although states may use 
their regular state complaint resolution process for addressing 
such disputes, 100 they may employ other procedures for 
accomplishing this purpose, as well. 101 Where the private 
school is dissatisfied with the decision of the SEA, it may 
submit a complaint to the United States Department of 
Education ("USDOE"), in which case the SEA must provide 
corresponding documentation to the USDOE. 102 
C. IDEA! 2004 and Home-Schooled Students 
IDEA/2004's regulatory scheme 103 assigns to states the 
responsibility of defining "private schools or facilities" under 
the Act for both elementary104and secondary105 students. Thus, 
9:J. S ee 20 U.S. C.§ 141 2(a)(10)(A)(iii)(V). 
94. Id.; See :34 C.F.R. § 300.134 (2007). 
95. S ee 20 U.S. C. § 1412(a) (lO)(A)(iv) . Where private school representa t ives 
cannot confer in person th e public agency personally may obtain input from the 
representa tives hy telephone. See 71 Fed . Reg. 46,596 (2006). 
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(iv); 34 C.F.R. § 300 .1 35 (2007). 
97. S ee 20 U.S. C.§ 1412(a)( l 0)(v)(J). 
98. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(v)(II). 
99. Id. 
100. See :34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151- 300.1 5:3 (2007). 
10 1. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.136; 300.1 40(c)(2) (2007). 
102. See 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(l)(A)(v)(ll) . 
103. See :34 C.F .R. §300.130 (2007). 
104. See :34 C.F.R. §300. 13 (2007). 
105. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.36 (2007). 
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state law determines whether a disabled, home-schooled pupil 
is a private school pupil eligible for the proportional 
distribution of services funded with IDEA/2004 money. 106 This 
creates a hodgepodge of approaches across states. Thus, 
IDEA/2004 further curtails the rights of home-schooled pupils 
relative to the already diminished rights enjoyed by students 
educated at places deemed "private schools" under state law. 
107 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF DISABLED STUDENTS ATTENDING SECTARIAN 
SCHOOLS TO RECEIVE SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RELATED 
SERVICES FROM LEAS AND SEAs 
A. Establishment Clause Considerations 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not 
necessarily bar IDEA/2004 public support for special needs 
children in sectarian private schools, but it does not require a 
state to support the child with public funds. In the leading case 
of Zobrest u. Catalina Foothills School District, 108 the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause does 
not bar a school district from providing a public employee to 
serve as a sign language interpreter for a profoundly deaf 
student placed by his parents in a Roman Catholic high school. 
The Court made clear that there is no general constitutional 
bar to furnishing such services on the site of a sectarian 
106. These provisions concerning parentally-placed private school students do not 
apply to students placed there by SEAs and LEAs for the purpose of receiving a free 
appropriate public education. See :34 C.F.R. § :300.145 (20ll7). 
107. See Edgerton Sch. Dist., 20 IND. WITH DISAil!LlTIES EDUC. L. REP. 126 (1993) 
(reversing hearing officer's order directing school district to furnish services to home 
schooled child over parent's objection). This appears to defeat the salutary purposes of 
educating all disabled students. See Samuel Ashley Lambert, Finding the Way Bach 
Home: Funding for Home School Children Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 
101 COLUlvl. L. REV. 1701, 1707-29 (2001) (arguing that home schools should be 
considered private schools for IDEA/2004 purposes). 
Regardless of whether a home schooled child is considered a "private school" student 
for purposes of receiving IDEA/2004 benefits, a school district may not compel the 
parents to submit the child to an evaluation. Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-ITI Sch. Dist., 
439 F.3d 77:3 (8th Cir. 2006). 
108. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.Dist .. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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school. 109 
The Zobrest Court explained that the Establishment Clause 
does not bar religious organizations from participating in 
publicly sponsored welfare programs that neutrally provide 
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to 
religion (disabled children) . The court held that IDEA/2004 is 
such a program. 110 Upon examining the issue of whether 
IDEA/2004 "advances or inhibits religion," the Court concluded 
that the presence of the interpreter neither added to nor 
subtracted from the religious environment of the school. 111 
Moreover, the Court observed that children with disabilities 
are the primary beneficiaries of IDEA/2004, and that whatever 
benefits were reaped by the sectarian school were only 
incidental. 112 The Court found that since the IDEA/2004 
neither creates an incentive nor directly benefits religious 
schools , it does not unconstitutionally encourage religion. 113 
109. Id. at 8-10. Since the parties stipulated on this a ppeal tha t re ndition of the 
service pursuant to IDEN2004 was clearly secular, the Supreme Cour t did not analyze 
thi s factor in its opinion. Id. a t 4 n.l. In the court below the United Sta tes Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit , the court applied the three-part tes t se t forth in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1 971) (th e services must adva nce a secular legislative 
purpose, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not res ult in excessive 
government entanglement in the reli gious mission of the secta ria n school} ,and found 
the service had the primary effect of adva ncing religion. Zobrest v. Cata lina Foothills 
Sch . Dis t. , 96:3 F.2d 1190, 1194-96 (1992). It therefore found an Estab lish ment Clause 
viola tion. ld. Lemon cr iteria have been writ ten into the EDGAR regulations at 34 
C.F.H. § 76.532(a). They prohibit use of federal monies for religiou s purposes including 
pay ment for religious worship, ins truction or proselytis m or equipment or supplies 
furni shed by the State or its s ubgra ntees fo r any of these purposes. Td. 
110. The Zobrest court relied in part on the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in 
Mueller u. Allen, 46:3 U.S . ::J88 (1 983) in its analysis. 509 U .S. a t 8- 10. In Mueller, the 
Court held that a state statute which permitted parents to take income ta x deductions 
for educational expenses they incurred in sending their childre n to public and private 
schools (including sectarian ones) did not violate the Establishment Clause. 463 U.S. at 
402- 04. The court reasoned th a t the statute was neutral as to religion in that it 
benefitted all parents, not just those parents who chose to send their children to 
w ligious schools. Id. at :'387. Moreover, the court saw the decision to se nd children to 
re ligious schools a s a pa rent , not governm ent initiated determination , thereby avoiding 
governmental acti vities which offe nded t he Establishment Clause. !d . at :399. 
111. Zobrest, 509 U. S. at 1:1. 
11 2. /d . at 12. 
ll3. ld. at 10- 13. The Zobrest case foreshadowed Mitchell v. Helms, 5:30 U.S. 793 
(2000), which held that Cha pte r 2 of Ti tle I of the Elementary a nd Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, under which federal government distributes fund s to state and 
local governmental agencies, which in turn lend educationa l ma terials a nd equipment 
to public and private school s, did not violate the Establishment Cla use . The 2007 IDEA 
Final Part B Regulations require tha t the public agency reta ins title to property. 
equi pment and supplies used to provid e special education a nd r elated services to 
parentally-placed pri vate school s tuden ts and that they only be appli ed to uses and 
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Courts have adhered to Zobrest in holding that providing 
special education and related services on-site at sectarian 
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause.114 
In 2002, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute against 
an Establishment Clause challenge. 115 The statute publicly 
funded a school voucher program, in which ninety-six percent 
of the student participants from the underperforming 
Cleveland public schools chose to attend religious schools. 1·16 An 
important reason the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
program was that it provided parents with a wide range of 
choices among religious and non-religious schools, including an 
after-school tutorial program at students' home schools. 117 The 
court viewed this as short-circuiting direct government support 
of sectarian schools, since the parents independently chose 
where the money went. 1111 
pur poses under the Act. 34 C. F.R. § 300.144 
11 4. Sec, e.g. , Peter v. Wedl , 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998) (one-on-one 
pa ra professional services); Helms v. Picard, 151 F. :1d :147 (5th Cir. 1998) (direct 
instruction to parochial school student); Russman v. Bel. of Educ .. 150 F'.3d 2 19 (2d Cir. 
1998) (consultant teacher services to r eligious school teacher) ; Peck v. Lansing Sch. 
Dist ., 148 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. Hl98) (occupational therapy and behaviora l therapy). 
Fur a n interesting case which found an Establishment Clause violr~tio n, see Americans 
United fur Separation of Church a nd State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 4:12 F. 
Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (where the court held, among other things, that the 
sta te viola ted the excessive entanglement requirement when it financed a pre-t·elease 
reha bili tation program in sta te prison through a contract with a group tha t, in effect, 
set up a n Evangelical Christia n church with compelled participation of inmates 
seeking reha bilitation). 
115. Zelman v. Simmons-Ha rris, 5af; U.S. 639 (2002). 
116. ld. at 64:1-47 . 
117. Td. at 652-54. 
11 8. Td. The court also found t hat no financial incentives e xi ~ted which were 
skewed toward religious institutions, since the aid was allocated on the basis of neutral 
secular criteria. Id. at 653- 654. The fa ct that a higher percentage of s tudents selected 
sectarian schools was deemed irreleva nt by the court. Id. at 658 - 69. 
Nota bly, in her Zelman concurr ence Justice O'Connor applied the so-called 
"endor se ment test" for determining the constitutionality of governm ental aid programs, 
such as the one challenged there. !d. a t 668--676. Instead of the Lemon criteria, she 
proposed a two-part tes t . Td . Fi rs t , >1 pmgnt m mu st admini ster "aid in a neutral 
fashion, without different ia tion based on the religious s tatus of the beneficiaries or 
providers of the services." ld. Second, the "be neficiaries of indirect a id [the parents] 
must have a genuine choice a mong religious and nonreligious organizations when 
determining the organiza tion to which they will direct that a id.'' 1d .. To date, a 
Supre me Court majority has not a dopted O'Connor's endorsement test . 
In re liance on Zelman, the court in L.M by H.M. v. Evesh a m Township Bd. of Educ. , 
256 F. Supp. 2d 290, :iO:i- 05 (D. N.J. 2003), rejected a school di s trict's challenge to a 
pa rent' s tuition reimbursement cla im on Establishment Clause ground s. concluding 
th at IDEA's reimbursement provi sion s satisfied the no "endorse ment test" and had a 
"secula r legislative purpose." Further it found the reimburse ment was "indirect aid 
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In 2006, the United States Department of Education 
adopted the long-awaited IDEA/2004 Final Part B Regulations, 
which appear to be consistent with IDEA/2004's provisions 
concerning privately-placed students and the United States 
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The new 
regulations make clear that services to parentally-placed 
private school children with disabilities may be legally 
provided on the premises of private, including religious, 
schools. 119 LEAs may not, however, use IDEA/2004 monies to 
finance the existing level of instruction in a private school, or to 
otherwise benefit the private school. 12° Further, Part B funds 
must be expended to meet the special education and related 
services needs of parentally-placed private school children with 
disabilities, 121 but cannot be used to meet the needs of private 
schools or the general needs of students enrolled in private 
schools. 122 Finally, LEAs may use IDEA/2004 funds to make 
public school personnel available in non-public facilities to the 
extent necessary to provide services, 123 so long as those services 
are not normally provided by the private school. 124 
... neutral with respect to religion ... [and] the reimbursement funds reach[ed] sectarian 
institutions only as a result of the wholly independent choices of individual parents." 
!d. 
119. :34 C.F.R § 800.189(a) (2007). 
120. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(a) (2006). 
121. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(b) (2006). 
122. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(b)(1)(2)(2006). 
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.130-144 (2006). 
124. 34 C.F.R. § 300.142(a)(b) (2006). Arguably, the 2006 IDEA Part B Regulations 
are built on the erroneous assumption that religious schools do not provide special 
education and related services to disabled children. What if, for example, a sectarian 
school contracts with a private agency to deliver group speech and language therapy 
services to three of its students (predicated on a prior arrangement with the children's 
parents they would reimburse the sectarian school on a pro-rata basis for its out-of-
pocket costs). Whether analyzed under Zobrest , Zelman. or Justice O'Connor's 
"endorsement test," no constitutional harm would ensue by the LEA reimbursing the 
sectarian school for the speech and language services with IDEA/2004 funds, to the 
extent consistent with other IDEA/2004 provisions; paying the service provider 
directly, to the extent consistent with other IDEA/2004 provisions; or paying the money 
to the parents (through a special education voucher) redeemable by either the service 
provider or the sectarian school in an amount consistent with other IDEA/2004 
provisions. 
The 2006 IDEA Part B Regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 300.144 contain rules for delivery on-
site at private schools of property, equipment, and supplies. LEAs may purchase 
personal computers for privately placed students where the computer helps the student 
overcome disability-related communication difficulties. !d. Computers are similar to 
the interpreter in Zobrest, in that their purpose is to assist the child in overcoming his 
ability to communicate and not for religious worship, instruction or proselytism, or in 
violation of Establishment Clause prohibitions. Of course, the fact that the 
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B. Free Exercise Clause Considerations 
The Free Exercise Clause does not require a state to fund 
all educational programs permitted under the Establishment 
Clause. In Locke v. Davey, 125 a non-special-education case, the 
Supreme Court dismissed a claim asserting that regulations 
promulgated by Washington State violated the First 
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 126 The state regulations 
forbade using state scholarship funds to train students for the 
ministry, but they permitted using them for training in other 
occupational categories. 127 The Supreme Court explained that 
the Free Exercise Clause did not reqmre funding all 
government programs that are permitted under the 
Establishment Clause. 128 It held that the state of Washington 
did not, in this case, violate the Free Exercise Clause by 
refusing to fund devotional degrees. 129 The Court determined 
that the state had a compelling interest to refuse the funding of 
theological instruction, even though it funded training for 
secular professions; the state's refusal was not based on 
religious hostility, but on the permissible purpose of avoiding 
religious establishment in violation of state constitutional 
reqt~irements . 130 
Similar results were obtained in Free Exercise claims based 
on unequal treatment under the IDEA. In Gary S. v. 
Manchester School District 131 the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
Establishment Clause permits provision of special education and related services on 
religious school premises by LEA and SEAs does not ipso facto create an entitlement to 
such services. Such rights must be created by state or federal statute (consistent with , 
respectively, federal or state constitutions), or by constitutions themselves. 
125. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
126. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding which 
found the law to be unconstitutional. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715 . The Ninth Circuit had 
concluded th at the state had singled out unconstitutionally religion for unfavorable 
treatment by its exclusion of theology majors from its scholarship program. Davey v. 
Locke, 299 F 3d 748, 757-758 (9th Cir. 2002). 
127. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715. 
128. Id. at 712. 
129. Id . at 725. 
130. !d. at 722-25. But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533-534, (1993) in which the Supreme Court found a Free Exercise 
violation where a local ordinance targeted the Santeria religion's rituals and prohibited 
animal sacrifices, but not those activities more generally in actual practice. Such laws 
must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny: "[they]must be justified by a compelling 
government interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Id .at 
531. 
131. 374 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004), 
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rejected a Free Exercise claim that private school students are 
entitled to receive benefits equal to those of public school 
students under IDEA/2004. According to the court, the 
plaintiffs were not being deprived of a generally available 
public benefit because they exercised their religious 
convictions; rather, they made a choice not to accept 
IDEA/2004 benefits only available to them in the public 
setting. 132 Neither the student's nor the parents' free exercise 
of religion were infringed upon by Congress' refusal to fund 
sectarian or nonsectarian private schools, and the Court held 
that IDEA/2004 did not selectively burden religious conduct. 133 
Ultimately, the court observed that "no cognizable burden on 
religion has been caused by the federal government's failure to 
provide to disabled children attending Catholic schools the 
same benefits it provides to disabled public school children." 134 
Thus, it is unlikely that parents who sue LEAs or SEAs on the 
ground that IDEA's unequal treatment of privately versus 
publicly enrolled students unduly burdens their First 
Amendment Free Exercise liberty will succeed in their 
efforts. 135 
IV. TREATMENT OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS 
UNDER IDEA/2004: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS SCRUTINY 
A. Equal Protection Clause Considerations 
Similarly, claims which have asserted a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
based on a different treatment of private and public school 
students under the IDEA have been unsuccessful. 
LEAs are not required to furnish a FAPE to students 
unilaterally placed in private schools. The court in Gary S. 
rejected an Equal Protection Claim, in addition to the Free 
132. Id. a t 20. 
1:33. I d. at 18-22. 
134. ld. at 21. 
135. ln Anderson v. Town of Durham, 89 A.2d 944, 958- 959 (200G) , cert denied, 
127 S.Ct. GGl (2006), a non-special education case, the court applied a rational basis 
test and held that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated when the St.at.e provided 
tuition vouchers to students attending nonsectarian, but not sectarian private schools. 
Among other reasons, "excessive entanglement'' of state and religion was considered an 
adequate justification for withholding tuition vouchers to sectarian schoo ls . /d. at 961. 
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Exercise Claim. 136 There, parents asserted that IDEA/2004 had 
"infringed upon their fundamental right to direct [their son's] 
upbringing and education because it deprives him of a FAPE 
and a due process hearing while offering these benefits to 
students who receive special education services at public 
schools and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny." 137 
The court applied a rational basis test to the distinctions made 
between students enrolled in public school programs and those 
unilaterally placed in private schools. The court concluded 
there was no constitutional violation. 138 It held that requiring 
LEAs to furnish a FAPE was a heavy burden, and that 
Congress acted rationally in deciding not to increase this 
responsibly by extending it to students enrolled unilaterally in 
private schools. 139 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Considerations 
IDEA's discrimination between publicly- and privately-
enrolled pupils does not offend constitutional due process 
principles either. In Gary S., the parents also contended that 
IDEA/2004 violated their substantive due process rights 
because it required them to relinquish their religious beliefs 
1 >lfi. :n 4 F.:id at 17. 
137. ld. a t 22. 
1 :38. !d. a t 22- 2a. 
1:~9. !d. at 2 :~. See also Eulitt ex rel . Eulitt v. Maine Dep't of Educ. , :~86 F. ild :H4 
(2004). The Eulitt court considered whether "the Equal Protection Clause require ld] 
Maine to extend tuition payments to private sectarian secondary school s on behalf of 
studen ts who reside in a school district that makes such payments ava ilable on a 
limited basis to private nonsectarian schools.'" !d. at 846. 1t held that it does not. ld. In 
reliance on Locke, 540 U.S. at 712, the court observed that the Free Exe r·cise Clause 
was the primary framework f(Jr assessing religious discrimina tion claims, and that if 
the cha llenged program does no violence to Free Exerci se, no religious discrimination 
claim can he stated. Eulitt, :386 F.:3d at :354. Thus, in Eulitt the plaintiff could not 
circumvent the Free Exercise Clause by asserting under the Equal Protection Clause, 
an unconstitutional burden on the fundam ental right of religious practice, a nd achieve 
a heightened level of scrutiny of the government's classification. ld. Accordingly, the 
court applied rational basis s tandards and found they were easily satisfied. ld. Those 
grounds includ<ed concentration of the state's limited funds, avoiding religious 
entanglement. and allaying concerns about. state oversight of religious schools' 
curricula . /d. at a56. See also Bristol Warren Reg'] Sch. Comm. v. R.I. Dep't of 
Elementary a nd Secondary Educ. ,25:3 F. Supp. 2d 2:36, 24 :3 (D.lU . 200:3) (the court held 
that the decision of the local school dis trict under IDEA/2004 to provide a resource 
room progra m to disabled s tudents on-s ite at some religious schools (which were wit hin 
walking di sta nce of public schools), hut not on-site at others (which were farther away), 
did not viola te the Equa l Protection Clause of Fourtee nth Amendment. The court 
applied the rationale basis test and found that district's "wa lking distance rule" passed 
constitutional muster). 
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and their right to control their child's education in order to 
receive a FAPE and IDEA/2004's procedural protections. 140 
Like their other claims, this one was unsuccessful. 141 Here, the 
court applied the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. 142 It 
noted that both the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have 
"consistently refused to invalidate laws which condition a 
parent's ability to obtain educational benefits on the parent's 
relinquishment of her right to send her child to private 
school." 143 Moreover, the court determined that, in this case, 
the parents were not forced to surrender their religious beliefs 
or their right to control their child's education in order to 
receive IDEA/2004 benefits. 144 
V. DECISION MAKING AS TO SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RELATED 
SERVICES FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS UNDER IDEA/2004: 
THE ISSUE OF ARBITRARINESS AND ADEQUACY OF THE 
REMEDIES 
In addition to IDEA/2004's failure to create an individual 
entitlement to programs and services for parentally-enrolled 
private school pupils, to guarantee that programs and services 
will correspond to students' needs , and to insure that agreed-to 
education will be delivered on-site at the private school the 
disabled child attends, IDEA/2004 lacks discernable criteria for 
LEA's to apply when making decisions concerning these 
children. Moreover, LEAs' virtually unfettered discretion in 
assignment of IDEA/2004 benefits with respect to parentally-
placed private school children, coupled with the vagueness of 
the statutory remedies for compliance failures , will probably 
leave parents with rights in name, but not in fact. 145 
140. Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). 
141. Id. 
142. See I d. 
143. Id. The court relied on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462, (1973); Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 4 77 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Strout v. 
Albanese, 178 F .3d 57, 66 (l. st Cir. 1999) for this proposition . Id. at 23. Relying on 
Regan v. Taxation with Represent ation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983), t he court 
observed that the Supreme Court has held that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize 
the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that r ight, and thus is not subject 
to strict scrutiny." ld. at 22 . 
144. ld. a t 23. 
145. Similarly, IDEA/2004 fails to provide sta tes with specific guidance on how to 
ensure LEA compliance with IDEA's subst a nt ive provisions. See A.A. v. Philips, :386 
F .3d 455, 459 (2nd Cir. 2004) (observing tha t while assigning a general supervisory 
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Assuming that actionable claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses are 
unavailable, 146 claims may exist under state laws which have 
established educational entitlements in privately enrolled 
disabled students, on the ground that the public agency's 
actions were arbitrary or capricious. 147 Thus, a state cause of 
action may be available on behalf of these privately enrolled 
students to redress program, service, or implementation 
failures. Where parents initiate a direct action against an LEA 
or SEA, those agencies will very likely interpose the defense 
that the parents have failed to exhaust IDEA and/or state 
mandated administrative remedies before going to court. 148 
Thus, parents will likely end up being relegated to the very 
procedures they hoped to avoid. 
VI. STATE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS WHICH PROVIDE 
BENEFITS TO PARENTALLY-ENROLLED PRIVATE SCHOOL PUPILS 
WITH DISABILITIES IN EXCESS OF THOSE PROVIDED UNDER THI<~ 
IDEA 149 
State statutes may require LEAs to provide more generous 
role to SEA's over LEA's IDEA/2004 does not set forth the specific requirements of that 
role[, except for requiring formulation of policies and procedures] and granting 
discretion to the SEA to work with the LEA to ensure compliance with IDEA). 
146. Professor Mark Weber of the DePaul University School of Law has suggested 
"another thread of due process doctrine" may be available to aggrieved parentally-
placed private school pupils. Mark C. Weber, Services for Private School Students 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory 
Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J. L. & EDUC. 163, 206-
07 (2007). Relying on, among other cases, White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 
1976), he suggested that Due Process requires ascertainable standards which are 
"written down and publicly available" in the context of distributing government 
benefits like IDEA's. Weber, at 206-207. Since IDEA/2004 sorely lacks meaningful 
standards for LEA decision making with respect to parentally-placed private school 
pupils, those decisions may be subject to Due Process attack. Notably, this 
"transparency in government administration of benefits" requirement does not depend 
on the existence of a property or liberty interest for its viability. Id. at 207. 
14 7. See Weber, supra note 146. 
148. See IDEA § 1415(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2007) (requiring parties to exhaust 
their available administrative remedies before filing a civil action). 
149. Generally states are prohibited from using Part B funds to provide services to 
children who are not included in IDEA's definition of children with disabilities as 
defined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. However, they may use those funds where special 
education, related services or supplementary aids and services are "provided to a child 
with a disability in a regular class or other education-related setting to a child with a 
disability in accordance with the IEP of the child, even if one or more nondisabled 
children benefit from these services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.208(a)(1). 
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benefits to parentally-placed private school students than 
IDEA/2004 in at least four ways. First, state standards of 
"appropriateness" may require more than IDEA's "basic floor of 
opportunity," as set forth in Rowley. 150 This may result in 
students receiving a greater frequency, duration, and/or 
intensity of services than under IDEA/2004 itself. Second, state 
laws may create an entitlement to a broader range of programs 
and services than mandated by the IDEA. Although related to 
"appropriateness," such mandates might provide for programs 
and services not included in IDEA's definition of special 
education and related services-for example, habilitation or 
medical services in addition to those for "diagnostic or 
evaluation purposes". 151 Third, state laws may require that 
programs and services be delivered on-site at a private school 
or other locations, whereas IDEA/2004 may not require 
provision of location-specific services. Fourth, state laws may 
expand the scope of coverage beyond IDEA/2004 for privately-
educated pupils to include, for example, home-schooled pupils. 
Most claims on behalf of students who are parentally-placed in 
alternative private settings have asserted entitlements under 
more than one of these alternatives. 
A. Appropriateness 
Where state law standards of appropriateness exceed 
IDEA's FAPE m1mmum, those standards may become 
enforceable as a matter of federal law under IDEA/2004. 152 
This is because IDEA/2004 provides that "the term [FAPE] 
means special education and related services that - meet the 
standards of the [SEA]. . . "153 For example, state law 
150. 458 U.S. at 200. 
151. IDEA/2004 medical services are limited to evaluations. 34 C.F.R. ~§ :100.34(a). 
(c)(5). 
152. See Gcis v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d 575, 580-81 (:od 
Cir. 1985) (commenting that where the federal law incorporates by reference 
requirements established by state law, the federal law confers on the federal courts 
authority to enforce those standards under their "federal question" jurisdiction); David 
D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. 2d 639, aff'd 775 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir. 
1985) (noting, among other things, that Massachusetts requirement that a child's 
services "maximize" his potential was incorporated into IDEA/2004 such that they 
become enforceable as a matter of federal law); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 
F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that "even if a school district complies with 
federal law, it will still violate the [IDEA] if it fails to satisfy the more extensive state 
protections that may also be in place"). 
153. IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B) (emphasis added). 
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provisions that exceed IDEN2004 mandates may require 
programming to meet the child's needs "according to how the 
pupils can best achieve success in learning,"154 and to provide 
"the fullest possible opportunity to develop their intellectual 
capacities. "155 Such provisions have been incorporated into 
federal law. 156 In the same vein, federal courts have enforced 
state laws that exceed IDEA's minimum by requiring that 
educational programs provide "an equal opportunity for each 
individual with exceptional needs to achieve his or her full 
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other 
pupils." 157 Such state laws have also established procedures for 
reconciliation of inconsistent expert opinions beyond those 
required by IDEN2004. 158 But state standards that exceed the 
154. Geis. 774 F.2d at 582. In applying New Jersey law, the Geis court affirmed 
t he district court's determination th at required the child's place ment to continue at the 
private residential school preferred by the parents r ather than the public placement 
recommended by the school district. ld. at 583. In Bd. of Educ.of E.Windsor Reg'! 
Sch.Dist.v. Diamond , 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit again applied 
the "how the student can best achieve success in learning" standard , operative at the 
time the services were rendered a nd on the da te of review by the New J ersey 
Depart ment of Education, and concluded the parents ' placement of their severely 
disabled child in a residential facility was appropriate under New Jersey law, and 
ordered reimbursement to the parents for the costs incurred in making the placement. 
But see Ewing Twn. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S.V. , 1991 WL 186691 (D. N .• J. 1991). There. the 
cou rt rejected the parents' argument that a higher standard applied and concluded the 
Rowley standard was applicable. This was based on New J ersey regulations issued in 
1989 rej ecting any notion that New J ersey's standards for appropriateness exceeded 
Rowley's. ld. at *5. 
155. Geis, 774 F.2d at 582 (emphasis in original). In Burke County Bd. of Educ.v. 
Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982- 983 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit, observing that the 
policy of the state was to "ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to reach his full 
potential ," recognized that North Carolina "r equires a level of substantive benefit 
great er than that required under federal law." The court nevertheless denied the 
parents' request for habilita tion services in the child's home. Id. It reasoned that, even 
under North Carolina's more generous provisions (as compared to fed eral education 
law), habilitative services did not fall within the ambit of state special education 
manda tes . Id. at 984. 
156. Geis, 774 F.2d at 581(observing that "incorporation of state standards is 
explicit in the Act.''). 
l57. Pink v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch .Dist., 738 F. Supp. :345. 346- :347 (N.D. Calif. 
1990). 
158. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S. , 82 F.~3d 149::!, 1499 n.2 (!:J th Cir. 19~J6) 
(where the court found the di strict violated Washington law). But see Soraruf v. 
Pinckey Cmty. Schools, 208 F.3d 315 (Table), 2000 WL 245501 (6th Cir. 2000). In a n 
unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit rej ected the parents' contention that a Michigan 
statute. which required school hoards to "provide special education progra ms and 
services designed to develop the maximum potential of each handica pped person," 
imposed a n appropriateness standard higher than Rowley 's. The Soraru( court deferred 
to the SEA's interpretation of the quoted language and concluded that it was in essence 
precatory. id. a t :3, requiring only that the program "was reasona bly calculated to 
162 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
standards set forth in IDEA/2004 will not be enforceable if they 
conflict with other IDEA/2004 provisions. 159 Notably, there are 
a number of cases where parents have failed to establish that 
state standards exceeded those of the IDEA. 160 
provide [the student] with educational benefits." ld. The Sixth Circuit in Renner v. Bd. 
of Educ. of the Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (1999) , applying the same statute, 
also rej ected the parents' claim. However, the Renner court stated: "Under the higher 
Michigan standards U defendants proposed an adequate and sufficient plan to provide 
[the student] a free appropriate public education offering to meet and develop the 
'maximum potential' of this child in light of his abilities and needs" (emphasis added) . 
ld . at 646. According to the court "maximum potential" does not require a "model" 
education . ld. at 645. In light of the apparently conflicting language (applying a n 
amorphous higher standa rd and later reverting to Rowley standards) it is unclear how 
to apply the Michi gan law. 
In Doe v. Tullahoma City Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994) the court, applying 
Tennessee law, rejected the parents' claim that the state's appropriateness standards 
exceeded Rowley's. The statute at issue(, Tenn. Code Ann. Section 49-10-101 (a)(1) ,] 
stated: "It is the policy of this state to provide, and to require school districts to 
provide, as an integral part of free public education, special education services 
sufficien t to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children" 
(emphasis added). The Court based its decision on the fact that: the Tennessee law pre-
dated the original 1975 version of the IDEA, the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act, P.L. 94-142, thereby making it impossible to infer that the legislature 
inte nded to exceed federal requirements. The Tennessee state courts had not 
interpreted the law to require more than what IDEN2004 requires, and "there was no 
hard evidence to indicate that the Tennessee legislature intended anything more than 
to remedy the past inadequacies of educational opportunities for the handicapped." /d. 
at 458. 
159. See 34 C.F.R. § ;{00.17(b) (2006). See also Amann v. Stow Sch. System, 982 
F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1992) (notwithstanding state's maximizing standard, the appropria te 
placement for a learning disabled pupil was in a public school rather than a pri vate 
school program exclusively for learning disabled pupils, in light of IDEA's least 
restrictive environment requirements) . 
160. See, e.g. , Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 199 F.3d 1116, 1122 (lOth Cir. 
1999) (t·ecognir,ing that if New Mexico regulations respecting "stay-pu t" righ ts exceeded 
the fed eral standard they would be enforceable under IDEN2004, if they are not 
inconsistent with IDEA/2004, but finding that New Mexico law did not exceed IDEA's 
requirf~ments in tha t case); O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Schs. Unified Sch. Dist., 144 F.:3d 
692, 701 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that Kansas law does not exceed Rowley standard of 
appropriateness); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1029- 1030 (lOth 
Cir. 1990) (concluding Oklahoma does not provide for a heightened sta ndard). In t he 
same vein, a United States District Court in Florida recently rul ed that the Florida 
constitution did not create a standard which exceeded Rowley's for an appropriatf• 
education for children with disabilities. Sch. Bd. of Lee County v. M. M. , 2007 WL 
98:3274 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
Where state standards exceed IDEA's minimum, they arguably create a liberty or 
property interest protected by the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State laws may do this explicitly. or by creating an expectation that gives 
rise to a vested right. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 69:1 (1976): !3d. of Regents v. 
Roth , 408 U.S. fi64 (1972) (state law defines the existence of property and liberty for 
the purposes of procedura l due process). 
flor an in terest in g discussion concerning state standards and IDEA/2004, see Gary L. 
Monscrud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children wit h 
Disabilities, 18 ST. ,JOHN'S .J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675 (2004). 
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B. Individual Entitlements and On-Site Services under State 
Law 
With respect to privately enrolled students with disabilities, 
two principal state law questions arise: (1) does the student 
enjoy an individual entitlement to services? And, (2) if so, must 
they be provided on the site of the private school? Since courts 
have tended to treat them together, these issues will be treated 
together in this article. 
In John T. v. Marion Independent School District , the court 
determined that Iowa law requires an LEA to provide the 
services of a full-time communications assistant to a student 
attending a private religious school. 161 Applying New York law, 
the Bay Shore Union Free School District v. T. court ordered an 
LEA to furnish a one-to-one aide to a "health impaired" student 
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder on the premises of 
a private sectarian school. 162 In Fowler v. Unified School 
District, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, under Kansas law, 
enforceable under IDEA/2004, a deaf child enjoyed an 
individual entitlement in excess of IDEA/2004 obligations to 
the on-site services of a sign language interpreter in a private 
non-sectarian school, to the extent that its cost did not exceed 
the average cost of providing hearing impaired students the 
161. 17:1 F.:'ld 684 (8th Cir. 1999). In John. 1'., the parties agreed that the student 
required a full -time communications assistant in order to function in a classroom 
environment. l d. at 6H7. This service was included in th<; student's IEP. Id . The LEA 
refused to provide the service at the religiou s school upon the parents' request, 
cla iming that its obligation did not extend to furnishing the assistance on the private 
school premises . ld. at 6HG-H7. The Iowa statute stated tha t school uistricts "shall 
make public school services ... available to children attending nonpuhlic schools in the 
sa me manner and to the same extent that they are provided to public school students." 
I OWA C OD E § ~56.1 2(2). The court denied the parents an attorneys' fee award on the 
ground they prevailed under state law a nd not [DI~A. John. T. , 17:! F.:~d at 689- 90. ln 
his di !;sen t on this point, ,Judge Cibson argued the majority improperly characterized 
the parents' prl'Va ilin~ claim as exclus ively s tate based. ld. at G !H-9:~ . He reaso ned 
that state law standa rds that impose a greater duty than IDEA/2004 to educate 
ha ndicapped children are enforceable under fDEN2004, if those standards are not, as 
in this case, inconsistent with federal law. l d. l n light of eases like David D. v. 
Da rtmouth Sch. Comm., (j J5 F. Supp. 2d !1:19 (1st Cir. 1985) (not cited by the disse nt) , 
the dissent argua bly ~ot the better of th e argument.. 
162. Bay Shore, 405 F. Supp. 2d at ~50. Interpreting New York's Dual Enrollment 
statute. the court. sa id: " [n a ease such as th is one, where a child requiring special 
education services is attending an appropriate priva te school fo r his core elementary 
education , a nd a requisi te service can he effective only in that. private school, under 
New York Law the school district must deliver th e service on th e premi ses of the 
private school." Td. 
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same service in the public schools .163 In John T. v. Delaware 
County Intermediate Unit, 164 the court applied Pennsylvania 
law as incorporated into IDEA/2004, concluding that the LEA 
was obligated to supply speech therapy, occupational therapy, 
a classroom aide and an itinerant teacher on-site at a Catholic 
school at levels reasonably calculated to afford the pupil 
educational progress for secular subjects only. 165 One 
Pennsylvania Court, construing its own laws, found that they 
contained requirements in excess of IDEA's requirements for 
parentally-placed student with disabilities. 166 Notwithstanding 
these results, states have tended to mirror IDEA/2004 in 
limiting parentally-enrolled private school students' individual 
right to on-site services. 167 
163. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist., 128 F. :)d 1431, 1439 (1997). In 199~) , Kansas 
a mended this statute. See K<\N. STAT. ANN. § 72-5393 (as amended by L. 1999, ch . 116. 
~ 40) . It now provides that the district of residence determines the s ite of service 
delivtery afte r consul t ing with the parents. l d. This represents a ret reat from the prior 
law which created an entitlement t.o on-site services a t the private school selected by 
the parents. Id. at 14:38 (citing KAN. STATE. ANN. ~ 72-5:39:-l). Notably, th e new law 
ma ndates provision of services to priva te school enrollees based on the d istrict of 
residence, not location like IDEA/2004. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(A)(i); Memorandum 
to Chief State 8ch. Officers, 4:-l IND. WITH DISABILITIES EllUC. L. Rr-:1'. 224 (OSEP 2005) 
Thus, Kan sas mandates services in excess of the IDEN2004 minimum in thi s respect. 
164. ,John T.v. Del. County In termediate Unit, 2000 WL 558582 (.KD. Pa . 2000). 
165. l d . at9-10. 
166. 8 ee Veschi v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist. , 772 A.2d 469, 475 (Pa. Commw. Ct . 2001) 
(the court determined that an TOEA-eligibl e s tudent was entitled to receive speech 
services in hi K local district while still attending his parochial school. The pr inciple 
statute applied, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §fi-502. provided in pert inent part: ''No pupil shall 
he refused admission t.o the courses in these additiona l schools or departments. by 
reason of the fact that his elementary or academic education is being or has !wen 
rec:eived in a school other than a public school."); see ulso Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. 
Doe, 931 A.2d 640 (2007) (a non-IDEA case). The Supre me Court of Pennsylva nia h eld 
that a school d is trict was required to provide occupationa l therapy services pursuant. to 
the Rehabilita tion Act , § 504, to a n otherwise eligible §504 studen t. who was enrolled 
fu ll time in a private school kindergar ten program. The court interpreted the 
Pennsylvania Code in relation to § 504 a nd constitutional Su premacy Clause 
princ iples. Jd. lt firml y rejected t he district's argument that the studen t's right to 
services hinged on hi s tuking courses in the public school setting. !d. It stated that"§ 
504's mandates apply to all potentia lly eligib le students based on t heir res idency, not 
thei >' school of attendance; as long as Doe is in the District's jmisdiction , the Dis trict 
has to provide what § 504 mandates." Jd. at 5. Thus, where LEAs refuse to s upply 
programs an d services to privately educa ted specia l education students under 
lDEA/2004 or state law , section 504 may he a source of rights not oth erwise avai lable 
under those statutes. 
167. ,Judge ,Jack Weinstein observed that the "widespread practice [among states! 
is to permit, but. not require, schoo l districts to provide services to students in private 
schools." Ray Shore, 40ii F. Supp. 2d a t 249. Hfl found this "unsurpri s ing'' in light of the 
fact that "most state programs, are patterned ex plicitly on the federa l statute !. citing to 
Ca lifornia. Pennsylvania , a nd Texas enactme nts ,] and regulations !, citing to Virginia's 
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C. Home-Schooled Students 
Services to home-schooled students are not required by 
IDEA/2004, but states may grant the students additional 
protection. Since IDEA/2004 delegates responsibility to the 
states to determine whether home-schooled students are to be 
considered "private school" pupils, such students may obtain 
even fewer IDEA/2004 benefits than the already attenuated 
ones enjoyed by parentally-enrolled private school students. 
The leading case addressing this issue is Hooks v. Clarl'l County 
School Di~trict. 16R The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the 
parents' claim for reimbursement for speech therapy services 
that the parents had obtained for their home-schooled child, 
because a "home school" was not included within the definition 
of a "private school" under Nevada law at that time. 169 
Although Hooks bars claims for IDEA-based services for 
home-schooled pupils where state law does not treat them as 
"private school" students, state law may nevertheless afford 
greater protection for home-schooled students. In Forstrom v. 
Byrne, 170 for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, held that a home-schooled child's right to 
equal protection under the New Jersey constitution was 
violated when an LEA refused to provide speech and language 
services to him, the school had invited nonpublic school 
children to participate in the services, and the student was 
willing to go to the public school to receive those services. 171 
VII. RESTRICTlVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION CLAUSES 
AND STATUTES, THEIR IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 
WHO ATTEND SECTARIAN SCHOOLS AND THE INVOCATION OF 
IDEA/2004 BY-PASS PROCEDURES 
While Zobrest:c; sign language interpreter and Zelman's 
and Arizona 's imple menting- regulations]." Jd. 
1 G8. 228 F.:·;d 10:'!6 (9th Cir. 2000). 
169. ld. After commencement of the Hooks case, the Nevada legislature amended 
its statute to require ·'each school district [to] provide programs of special education 
and related services for children who are exempt from compulsory attendance pursuant 
to the home-education exemption and receive instruction at home". Hooks at 1039 
(quoting Nev. Act. Chap. GOo, Sec. 45(1999), codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §392.070(2) 
(2000)). 
170. 775 A.2d 65 (200 1). 
171. !d. at 74-78. The New Jersey constitu t ion did not contai n an express equal 
protection clause but it has been read into its text. !d. at 75~ 77. 
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vouchers may be permissible as a matter of federal 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, they might offend State 
constitutional anti -establishment provisions. 172 After all, 
principles of federalism may reqmre deference to more 
restrictive state constitutions. 
Since state actors may be forbidden from engaging in 
Zobres t- or Zelman-type activities under state constitutional 
law, IDEA/2004 provides for so-called by-pass procedures. 
These procedures allow the United State Secretary of 
Education, upon complying with mandated procedures, to 
withhold federal funds from the LEA and apply them directly 
for the benefit of disabled students. 173 This avoids federal-state 
conflicts, while enabling students to receive the benefits they 
would have received, absent such conflicts, under IDEA's 
proportionality provisions. Where a by-pass is invoked, states 
may obtain a review of the Department of Education's 
decision. 174 
172. See, e.g . KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMimiCAN PUI3LIC 
SCHOOL LAW. 201-07 (6th Ed. 2005) (considering state supreme court decisions 
interpreting anti-establi sh ment provisions in state constitutions in Alaska, Colorado, 
Hawaii. Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Oregon , Washington and Wyoming, and concluding with respect to a id provisions 
affecting private schools that these States have more restrictive church-state 
separation requirements than the Establishment Clause of the United States 
Constitution). 
173. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(A). These involve "dividing the total amount received 
by t he State under Part B of the Act for the fiscal year by the number of children with 
disabil ities served in the prior year as reported to the Secretary ... by ... [t)he number of 
private school children with disabilities . .. in the State, LEA or other pu blic agency, as 
determined by the Secretary on the basis of the most recent satisfactory data available, 
which may include an estimate of the number of those children with disabilities," 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.1 90-198(2006), and deducting this amount from the total monies paid to 
the state, :14 C.F.R. § ::100.191(2006). 
174. A state may obtain further review in the United States Comt of Appeals for 
the Circuit where the state is situated. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(f)(3)(B). Although there is 
little reported lit igation involving IDEA/2004 by-pass procedures, the court in Foley v. 
Special Sch. Ois t .of St. Louis County, 153 F . 3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 199R) 1·ecognized that 
where the Missouri state constitution forb ade public school educators from rendering 
services on private school premises, JDEA/2004 by-pass could be applied for the 
students' benefit. It observed that by-pass "was an adequate and less intrusive 1·emedy" 
when state law frustrated delivery of IDEA/2004 services. I d. 
I] THE RIGHTS OF PARENTALLY-PLACED STUDENTS 167 
VIII.RECTIFYING INEQUITIES IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
FOR DISABLED STUDENTS WHO ARE ENROLLED IN PRIVATE, 
INCLUDING SECTARIAN, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS 
Those who support treating parentally-enrolled disabled 
children equitably, as compared to publicly-enrolled pupils, 
might consider lobbying Congress for appropriate amendments 
to IDEAJ2004. Broadly speaking, supporters could demand 
comparability of programs and services to those provided by 
LEAs and SEAs to publicly enrolled students. In most cases, 
this would require LEAs and SEAs to satisfy IDEA's 
appropriateness standards (albeit in a private setting), or more 
demanding state requirements, where applicable, for 
parentally-enrolled private school children. To be effective, 
such legislation would have to be carefully drafted to ensure 
that states received the "clear notice" mandated by the 
Spending Clause, especially in the wake of current "unfunded 
mandates" litigation. 175 Such careful drafting would include, 
for example, the express incorporation into IDEAJ2004 of state 
standards which exceed IDEA's standards. 
In fairness to LEAs and SEAs, the cost of comparable 
programs and services should not exceed those incurred by 
public agencies for identical programs or services. This would 
require the development of appropriate formulae to determine 
the costs of such activities when rendered by the public agency. 
For purposes of consistency in implementation, these formulae 
should be developed by the United States Department of 
Education and not delegated to the states. 
In the same vein, Congress should amend the Act to provide 
for the uniform treatment of home-schooled pupils. Since the 
current IDEAJ2004 allows states to furnish home-schooled 
pupils with fewer services than other privately educated 
students, their rights should be made comparable to other 
privately-educated disabled students under the proposed 
amendments. When providing comparable services would cost 
more than providing services for a publicly-enrolled student, 
LEAs and SEAs would retain the right to refuse to support 
those costs. That would be the price paid by the child for his 
parents' choice. This should not occur frequently, and where it 
17;). Sec, e.{;. , City of Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267. 
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does, the reduction in most cases would be de minimus. 
IDEA/2004 should be amended to provide parentally-
enrolled private school students with an individual entitlement 
to the comparable programs and services described above. 
These would be based on the LEA's recommended IEP. There is 
no sound reason to have IEPs for publicly-enrolled pupils, but 
"service plans" for parentally-placed private school pupils. 
These differences invite public agencies to exercise diminished 
care to the special needs children who are privately enrolled. 
Arguably, it suggests disrespect for such permissible parental 
choices. Since LEAs would not be obligated to fund the non-
special-education portion of the parentally-placed child's 
program, and cost ceilings of the kind mentioned above for 
special services could easily be incorporated into the Act, the 
special needs of unserved children would be met and fairly 
balanced against the costs incurred by public agencies. 
The amendments to IDEA/2004 relative to parentally-
placed private school pupils should include procedural parity as 
well. Where the public agencies fail to implement an agreed-to-
program, for example, privately-enrolled children should be 
protected through due process procedures identical to those 
protecting publicly-enrolled students. IDEA/2004's state 
complaint procedures for implementation and other failures 
provide a remedy in name, but not in substance, for parentally-
enrolled private school pupils. Without possessing the teeth of 
individually enforceable orders, the remedies contained in 
IDEA/2004 for privately-placed children are largely illusory. 
The coupling of substantive and procedural rights comparable 
to publicly-enrolled students would serve as a check on 
arbitrary decision-making by public agencies and encourage 
more thoughtful consideration by public agencies of individual 
students' needs. 
Where states could not comply with the proposed revisions 
due to state constitutional anti-establishment or other 
obstacles, 176 they would be obligated to give notice to the 
176. lD EN2004 recognizes three circumstances which wi ll trigger intervention by 
the Secreta ry through use of its by· pass procedures for parentally placed private school 
children wit h disabilities. Thf'se are the Secretary's determination that (1) state law 
prohibits providing equitable services in private schools, (2) that the school district or 
state educational agency have substantially failed to provide equitable services in 
private schools, or (::l) that the school district or SEA is unwilling to provide equitable 
services in private school s. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(1); 70 Fed. Reg. 35856 (200R): :-!4 C.F.R. 
§ 190(a) (2007). 
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USDOE of their inability or unwillingness to comply with the 
law's requirements. The USDOE would then be required to 
invoke IDEA/2004's by-pass procedures to ensure that 
privately-enrolled disabled children would be protected and 
receive benefits directly from the United States, comparable to 
the benefits given to disabled students enrolled in public 
schools. 177 To support the comparable programs and services, 
the USDOE could deduct monies from IDEA/2004 allotments 
proportional to the number of children who would be unserved 
due to the state's unwillingness or inability to comply with the 
law's requirements 178 and, where needed, from other federally 
funded educational programs. 179 The amended IDEA/2004 
would provide for a direct, private right of action to enforce the 
amended statute against the state recipients of IDEA/2004 
monies, including class action relief, and extend to prevailing 
parent plaintiffs the same rights as enjoyed by parents of 
publicly-enrolled children for the recovery of attorneys' fees and 
statutory costs. Of course, all these provisions would be made 
express, unequivocal and consistent with the Spending Clause 
notice requirements. 
Since such provisions might be difficult to achieve in 
Congress, advocates for parentally-placed, privately-enrolled 
children should focus their efforts in state legislatures, as well. 
177. 1DEN2004 provides that where the Secretary invokes the law's by-pass 
procedures he shall "arrange for the provis ion or services to sueh children." 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(!)(1); 70 Fed. Reg. 35856 (2005); :14 C. F.R. § 300.190(a). 
178. Under current law, if the Secretary is required to provide equitable services 
for privately-enrolled pupils under the by-pass procedures, payme nt for those services 
must be made by the U.S. Department of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(f)(2)(A); 70 Fed. 
Reg. :-15856 (2005): :34 C.F.R. § 300.19l(b)-(c) . The amount of payments to the 
provider(s) of such services sha ll he determined, after consultation with private and 
public school officials, to be an amou nt per child that does not exceed the amount 
established by the established formula. !d. The formula amount is determined by 
dividing the "total amount received by the State for the fiscal year'' by the "number of 
chi ldren with disabilities served in the prior year." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(2)(A)(i)-(ii); 70 
Feel. Reg. 35856 ,:35885 & 35889 (2005) ; .'34 C. F.R. §§ 300.706, § 811 (2007). 
179. Such programs could include the aforementioned "No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001," 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 , for example. Given their natural resistance to 
"unfunded mandates," some states would undoubtedly resist encroachment on federal 
funding beyond that provided by IDEA. However, the conditioning t he receipt of federal 
money on compliance with Congress' determination of what the Ge neral Welfare 
requires is firmly established in this country . See City of Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 261 
(explaining, in part, the evolution of federal aid programs to public schools). Moreover, 
"the overwhelming burden of [educational] funding in this country is and has always 
been borne by State and local governments." !d. at 277 (emphasis added). Even with 
NCLB, the federal government provides only seven percent of the total funding for local 
education. !d. 
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They might consider, for example, lobbying for legislation 
which ensures that parentally-placed private school children 
with disabilities enjoy (1) an individual entitlement to all 
programs and services based on their IEP, (2) comparability of 
funding supporting services received by students enrolled in 
public school programs, and (3) access to qualified personnel of 
the same kind as publicly-enrolled students. Where state 
statutes contain ambiguities concerning whether they exceed 
IDEA/2004 minimums, advocates for privately educated 
students could propose language which expressly states that 
the law is intended to exceed IDEA's floor of opportunity and 
the Rowley minimum, and delineate in what way. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The inequitable treatment received by parentally-enrolled 
private school children under IDEA/2004 defeats the stated 
purpose of ID EA/2004 itself: to provide all disabled children 
with an appropriate education. The administrative effort to 
serve such children equitably is more than amply justified by 
the educational benefits the children would receive if Congress 
had enacted comparability legislation of the kind suggested 
above. Since this proposal caps the cost to public agencies, so 
that they would not be required to spend more money than 
they would if these children were publicly-enrolled, there 
should be few objections to the proposal on financial grounds. 
Since privately-educated pupils' parents bear the cost of tuition 
for the student's general education, public agencies are relieved 
from that cost. Thus, there is a financial incentive for public 
agencies to render comparable special programs and services to 
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities and 
avoid the student's return to the public school. 
Since Congress failed to address the concerns raised in this 
article in IDEA/2004, advocates for parentally-enrolled private 
school students with disabilities should consider lobbying at 
the state level in tandem with their Congressional efforts. In 
most respects, efforts at the state level should mirror those at 
the federal level. State legislative enactments should, however, 
avoid ambiguities which appear in some laws previously passed 
and later became the subject of the litigation reviewed in this 
article. In particular, such laws should articulate in what ways 
they exceed IDEA/2004 protections with respect to, for 
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example, individual entitlements, standards of 
appropriateness, kinds of programs and services available to 
students, as well as the remedies for program and service 
compliance failures and the procedures for vindicating such 
rights. 
Parents of privately-educated disabled students who hope 
to obtain substantially equal educational benefits for their 
children under IDEA/2004, as compared to publicly-enrolled 
students, are unlikely to find the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as sources of such 
rights. Although the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment permits Congress under IDEA/2004 to confer 
educational benefits on a comparable basis to privately-
enrolled pupils who attend sectarian schools, Congress is not 
required to and has chosen not to do so. Furthermore, under 
current constitutional interpretation, Congress's decision does 
not run afoul of their First Amendment Free Exercise rights, 
notwithstanding some parental contentions to the contrary. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has respected states' sovereignty 
where their anti-Establishment provisions forbade assistance 
to religious schools, or they exercised their sovereign powers in 
an otherwise rational manner. 
The legislative initiatives suggested above do not disrupt 
the delicate balance of power between the federal and state 
governments set out in our constitutional scheme. Instead, they 
provide an opportunity for Congress to pick up the gauntlet of 
reform in a manner consistent with the requirements of the 
Spending Clause, while showing appropriate respect for state 
sovereignty. Moreover, the reforms suggested at the state level 
may be undertaken independently so as to afford each 
jurisdiction the opportunity to exercise their traditional control 
over educational policy and to select the alternatives which 
meet the special needs of the students they serve. Although 
Congress and most states have decided to discriminate in the 
provision of special education and related services between 
parentally-placed private school pupils with disabilities and 
disabled children who are publicly-enrolled, it is within the 
entities' power to do so. The contention of this article is that 
they have made a bad choice. 
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